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Abstract 
After the failure to respond adequately to the changing patterns of conflict and 
violence after the end of the Cold War, human security was popularized in the 
1990s as an alternative concept to security more suitable to face threats to 
individual security. Ever since, the question about what human security should 
entail has seen much discussion. This paper examines the different discourses 
which influence human security as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from 
want”. It situates the concept in what can be understood as the new security 
landscape, and examines how the different understandings of human security have 
influenced policy at the level of the United Nations. Performing an analysis based 
in the theoretical foundation of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse 
theory, this paper presents how human security is the target of a discursive 
struggle, as different discourses seek to hegemonize the concept. The paper goes 
on to analyze at a discursive level the hegemonization of human security within 
the UN, and concludes by presenting several reasons to why human security has 
increasingly been seen as a preventive approach.   
Key words: human security, freedom from fear, freedom from want, new security 
landscape, Responsibility to Protect, Laclau and Mouffe, discourse theory, 
discursive struggle, hegemony.  
Words: 21069 
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Abbreviations 
CDA  Critical discourse analysis 
CHS  Commission on Human Security 
HSN  The Human Security Network 
ICISS  The International Commission on Intervention and State 
  Sovereignty 
IR  International Relations 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
R2P  Responsibility to Protect 
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNSG  United Nations Secretary General 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the discursive struggle for human security. The concept has 
been debated ever since its popularization in the mid-1990s, and the discussion 
about what human security should entail and how it should be operationalized has 
been ongoing since. The conceptualization of human security is still characterized 
by much contestation, and its relevance is debated in a changed security 
landscape, as human security shares the spotlight with similar, alternative, 
conceptions of security. This has led human security into a state of flux, as 
policymakers ask; is human security still relevant, and if so, what role should it 
play? 
1.1. Background and significance 
The popularization of human security can be traced to the 1994 Human 
Development Report, as it made evident how several security challenges could 
not be dealt with from a traditional state centric understanding of security, but 
required a revised security agenda which could provide solutions towards 
individual, human, security. In the scholarly debate on security, human security 
emerged as an alternative approach to traditional realist security, and can therefore 
be seen as one of the critical approaches to security getting foothold in the 1990s, 
as it was increasingly believed that new conceptions of security were required in 
order to respond to a ”new” Rwanda or Srebrenica. Alternative conceptions of 
security can be traced even further back, and in 1983 Richard Ullman got much 
attention with his article ”Redefining Security” (1983) in which he sought to 
widen the definition of security, by stressing the need to move away from a purely 
militarized understanding of state security. 
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 While human security has been seen as a tool for policymaking better 
suited to face the new threats to individuals in what can be referred to as ”the new 
security landscape” (Piciotto et al. 2007: 105ff) and the ”new wars” (Kaldor 
2007), the concept has been questioned due to the confusion regarding different 
interpretations of human security. Alkire (2004) discusses how there are over 
thirty definitions of human security, and the unclarity surrounding the concept has 
led some scholars to argue for the possibility to treat human security as a 
”political leitmotif”. This means that human security would constitute a discourse 
containing a loose set of values which can influence security policy, instead of 
being treated as a policy agenda in itself (see Ewan 2007; Floyd 2007; Werthes & 
Debiel 2006). 
 Despite being criticized for conceptual unclarity, human security helped 
its main advocators Japan and Canada to strengthen their international security 
profile without being permanent members of the UN Security Council. This was 
evident in how the Canadian conception of human security was highly influential 
in the emergence of the concept ”Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), outlining 
guidelines for humanitarian intervention (Remacle 2008: 6-14; Suhrke 2004: 
365). Still, the vagueness and the differing conceptualizations of human security 
have been debated on many levels, not least within the UN where frequent 
discussions regarding the importance of human security mainstreaming within 
various UN bodies have taken place (UN News Centre 2010; Timothy 2004). The 
applicability of human security is believed to hinge on a common understanding 
of the concept (Piciotto et al. 2007; Tadjbakhsh 2009), and agreeing on such a 
common understanding has been a major focus of deliberation within the UN over 
the two last decades. Still, Kettemann (2011) argues that the international 
community failed to make proper use of its human security mainstreaming agenda 
during the intervention in Libya, and points to a ”conflict gap” between a 
preventive human security application and aspects of humanitarian intervention. 
 Keeping the history of human security in mind, it seems that the 
interpretation of the concept in many ways remain in a state of flux. Thus, the 
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question about how to conceptualize human security is crucial for the concept to 
be effective as a policy agenda. 
1.2. Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine how human security is constructed and 
understood, and how this understanding affects human security policy. In order to 
understand the origins and development of policies we need to ”identify the 
discourses that dominate in them, how they come to do so, and which discourses 
are excluded and marginalized in the process” (Paul 2009: 243). Policy texts can 
be understood as ”an arena of struggle over meaning” (Taylor 2004: 435), and the 
outcome of policies as the result of struggles ”between contenders of competing 
objectives, where language - or more specifically discourse - is used 
tactically” (Fulcher 1989: 7). The rift in human security and the vagueness of the 
concept has had implications for its utilization as coherent policy. Therefore, my 
thesis will study how human security discourse is presented as policy, by 
analyzing the evolution of the concept. I will scrutinize the context in which 
human security originated as one of many alternative conceptions of security, and 
analyze how different discourses seek to fill human security with meaning, to 
define and hegemonize the concept. When the main discourses have been 
identified, I will perform a discursive analysis of the understanding of human 
security within the UN. Thus, this paper is situated in an ongoing research 
environment scrutinizing the conceptual debate on human security, as well as 
human security mainstreaming within the UN. It builds on a literature where 
notable earlier contributions consists of Acharya (2001), Alkire (2004), Bellamy 
and Williams (2006), Ewan (2007), Kaldor (2007, 2012), Kettemann (2011), 
Krause (2007), Piciotto et al. (2007), Remacle (2008), Ryerson (2010) and 
Tadjbakhsh (2007, 2009) among others. 
 It is my intention that this study will elucidate the conceptual struggle for 
human security, and point to how this struggle is translated into UN policy, 
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through human security mainstreaming of a certain understanding of the concept. 
Thus, the main research questions for the thesis are: 
1. Examining the conceptual understandings that shape human security; how, 
and in what context, has the concept of human security evolved?  
2. To what extent is it possible to identify competing discourses fighting for 
hegemony over human security; what are their arguments and differences, and 
how do these differences affect human security as policy? 
3. Which conceptualization of human security enjoys hegemony within the UN? 
How can the consensus for this conceptualization be explained, and what 
implications does it have for the operationalization of human security as 
policy? 
1.3. Structure 
The thesis begins with an introduction outlining the problem area, followed by a 
declaration of background and significance, and purpose and research questions. I 
will then present the theoretical and methodological foundations for the thesis, as 
well as delimitations and justification of material. After these introductory 
chapters, the thesis will turn to the conceptual debate seen within security studies, 
presenting differing views on how to conceptualize security, and situate human 
security within academia. I will then point to how the need for alternative 
conceptions of security arose. I will do so by presenting the changing conditions 
of what can be referred to as ”the new security landscape” (Piciotto et al. 2007), 
and how a changed world order after the Cold War presents challenges that 
requires new conceptualizations of, and solutions to, security in order to be met. 
Here I will elaborate on overarching trends influencing the popularity of human 
security, and also discuss the concept responsibility to protect (R2P) and its 
relation to, and implications for, human security. Chapters 3 and 4 will illustrate 
the application of human security in this new security landscape, by analyzing 
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how human security policy is articulated in accordance with different 
conceptualizations, and finally analyze which conceptualization that enjoys 
hegemony within the UN. In chapter 4.2 the main findings of the analysis will be 
interpreted against the background of the previous discussion. The paper ends 
with concluding reflections, where I also point to future considerations within this 
area of research. 
1.4. Theory and methods 
Critical security theory; a constructivist view of security 
The theoretical positioning for the thesis is stemming from the constructivist 
paradigm within qualitative research (Creswell 2014: 8). By examining the 
conceptual understandings that shape the debate about human security through a 
constructivist mindset, I intend to present patterns in this debate that could reveal 
how human security is translated into policy, a process similar to deconstruction. 
Turning to Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, Laclau describes the unveiling of 
hegemonic discourses by pointing to how deconstruction and hegemony are ”two 
sides of a single operation” (Laclau 1993: 281). Similarly, human security can be 
understood as an effort to reconstruct the interpretations of what constitutes the 
roots of insecurity, underdevelopment and poverty, themes of interest for 
constructivism (Tadjbakhsh 2007: 88-89). Dillon argues that there is no such thing 
as objective security, since the question about security is a discursive one; ”There 
are always political discourses of (in)security which constitute the subjectivities 
on whose behalf they claim to speak and act, in the image of dangers they 
discursively specify” (Dillon 1990: 108). Therefore, it is vital to examine how a 
subject in need of security is created, as well as what threats this subject is in need 
of security from in order to identify differentiating positions about how the 
security concept should be constructed, understood and utilized. Thus, the 
constructivist approach is used to analyze the “culture of security”, and how 
discursive change happens as elements of existing discourses are articulated 
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together to form new inter-discursive mixes (Steans & Pettiford 2005: 197; 
Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 157). As stressed by Krause and Williams, a 
fundamental question the constructivist position within critical security asks is: 
What is the referent object of security? Who or what is to be secured? (Mutimer 
2007: 57). Since different understandings of human security disagree on the threat 
perception against human security - that is, the nature and scope of threats to 
account for - a similar question is; what does ”human” security entail - what is 
the individual to be secured from, under what circumstances, and with what 
means? The question is essential for this thesis, as it is imperative to the 
construction of the human security concept, and to the formulation of policy based 
on this construction. It can be understood as a process of (in)securitization, which 
takes place when actors talk about human security, and frames it as a subject 
position in need of securitizing against a certain perception of threats. 
(In)securitization, coined by the Paris school within critical security, views the 
concept of ”security” as fought over by (in)security professionals. Thus, its 
definition depends on the differing opinions of what is seen as the most urgent 
security threat, worthy of securitizing (Baylis 2008: 162-171; Bigo 2008: 
125-127).  
 Considering this constructivist view of security, this thesis will examine 
the concept of human security by taking its overarching theoretical positioning 
from the constructivist view within critical security studies, and draw on aspects 
visible in both the Paris school and a broader understanding of critical security as 
described by Krause and Williams. I will further discuss these approaches in 
chapter 2, but some principles that describe the theoretical underpinnings of this 
thesis can be found in Krause’s guidelines to critical security studies: Principal 
actors are social constructs; These actors are constituted through political 
practices; The structures of world politics are neither unchanging nor determining 
because they too are socially constructed; Knowledge of the social world is not 
objective, as there is no divide between the social world and the knowledge of that 
world; Natural science methodology is not appropriate for social science, which 
requires an interpretative method (Mutimer 2007: 67). 
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Discourse and qualitative text analysis: some acknowledgements 
The study will be carried out through a qualitative text analytical method based in 
discourse analysis, as this paper identifies and partially deconstructs two different 
discourses struggling for influence on human security policy. As Punch (2005: 
224) puts it, discourse analysis is similar to deconstruction, as dismantling 
constructions unveil connections to ideology. In this paper a discourse is 
understood as a particular way of representing certain parts or aspects of the 
world. Thus, a discourse constitutes an important resource for actors interested in 
reproducing or challenging the social or political status quo. This definition is 
essentially in line with Fairclough (1992, 2005), although the paper will 
conceptualize the nature and structure of a discourse by departing from 
Fairclough’s theoretical framework and instead draw upon Laclau and Mouffe’s 
work, for reasons that will be elaborated on in chapter 1.4.2.  
 Discourse analysis is suitable to examine changes in perspectives over 
time to highlight contrasting views within a particular field, and unveil hegemonic 
patterns in a particular discourse, elucidating challenges for alternative approaches 
within this discourse. Thus, discourse analysis does not merely analyze the 
linguistic features of the text under scrutiny, but is able to situate the meaning of 
the text into a larger discursive environment, showing how language generated in 
a specific context is used to construct different meanings (Bergström & Boréus 
2005: 357; Fairclough 2003: 3). Esaiasson et al. stress the importance of applying 
a ”careful reading” of the text, and to be aware of different interpretations of the 
same word in different contexts. This is an essential part of my analysis, as it 
ultimately scrutinizes different interpretations of ”human security”. During the 
analysis I will pay attention to what Esaiasson et al. call latent content, in order to 
elucidate the hegemonic understanding of the different discourses on human 
security (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 221-224). A text presenting one understanding of a 
concept automatically excludes another, thus the need to look for what is missing 
from the discursive articulations; what is the text not saying, and what can be 
found in the discourse’s surplus? Presenting the analyses in chapters 3 and 4, I 
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will utilize the format suggested by Esaiasson et al. (2012: 224) and Jörgensen 
and Phillips (2002: 50-54), combining quotations and encapsulations with my 
own analysis. The conclusions drawn are summarized by showcasing key 
passages in the text, and the quotations will be used for the sake of transparency, 
to show that it is not my own presuppositions that are the foundation for the 
analysis. 
1.4.1. Methodological considerations 
Epistemological acknowledgements and reflexivity 
In the next sub-chapter I will point to how Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
combined with aspects of critical discourse analysis (CDA) can be operationalized 
in a critical discursive analysis of texts on human security policy. Before going 
into how the two methods can be fruitfully combined, I would like to 
acknowledge the epistemological differences between the two approaches. While 
CDA recognizes a distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, 
Laclau and Mouffe reject such a distinction and views the social world as being 
completely constituted by discourse. However, the focus Laclau and Mouffe put 
on the contingent nature of discourses is also acknowledged by Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, as they see how discourse theory offer valuable tools to analyze the 
process of discursive change; ”[w]e regard Laclau and Mouffe as providing 
valuable conceptual resources for the analysis of change in discourse - in 
particular their conceptualization of ‘articulation’ and ’equivalence/
difference’” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 124). The use of articulations 
dissolves the distinction between Fairclough’s three dimensions of text, discursive 
practice and social practice (see Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 66ff), and it gives 
shifting elements of the social relative permanence into moments within a certain 
discourse. Moments can take on shifting shapes when combined with each other 
in new ways, and equivalence/difference makes visible how signifiers produce 
different degrees of stability in discourses, as the moments are tied together in 
intertextual chains. 
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 In terms of validity and reliability, Laclau and Mouffe speak little of this. 
However, as is custom to most discourse analytical practice, it is important to 
apply the principle of ”reflexivity” throughout the research. While this could 
constitute a problem as a researcher cannot claim to be free from pre-existing 
knowledge and our social position, it is important to point out that the results and 
interpretations resulting from deconstructing discourse and analyzing its 
implications are the responsibility of the researcher. According to Esaiasson et al. 
(2012: 215), it is the researcher that tells a story drawing from the text; not the 
text that tells a story to the researcher. It is therefore important to be transparent in 
the analytical process, by clearly explaining the use of the methodological and 
analytical tools as well as the use of theory, and where I as a researcher position 
myself within the field of research. Reflexivity is a major part of this process, as it 
is crucial to reflect over the choices I make as a researcher and why (Jörgensen & 
Phillips 2012: 49, 116-119; Creswell 2014: 186). I intend to present this process 
clearly in the discussion about theory and methods, throughout the practical 
analysis in chapters 3 and 4, and during the presentation of my conclusions. 
1.4.2. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
While constructivism can be seen as an overarching theoretical standpoint for my 
thesis, the choice of discourse theory as method also has implications for the use 
of theory. Discourse theory is not only a theoretical framework which can be used 
to research a specific question, but also constitutes a methodological tradition. 
Therefore, theory and method become intertwined in a study using discourse 
theory. Jörgensen and Phillips (2002: 33) stress that ”the starting point of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that we construct objectivity through the 
discursive production of meaning. It is that construction process that should be the 
target of analysis”. This will be further elaborated on now. 
Discourse according to Laclau and Mouffe 
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Laclau and Mouffe define discourse, and presents the aspects of their discourse 
theory, in the following sense; ”We will call articulation any practice establishing 
a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of 
articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory 
practice, we will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear 
articulated within a discourse, we call moments. By contrast, we will call element 
any difference that is not discursively articulated” (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 
91). Discourse theory is influenced by the linguist scholar Ferdinand de Saussure, 
who presented a model to explain the relationship between language and material 
reality. Saussure argued that words - signs - have no meaning in themselves, but 
get their meaning when connected to other words (or signs) similar to knots in a 
fishing-net (Bergström & Boréus 2005: 315). While Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
structuralist belief rejects the idea that signs in language can ever be completely 
fixed, the fishing-net metaphor can help understand discourse theory since the 
creation of meaning as a social process ”is about the fixation of meaning, as if a 
Saussurian structure existed” (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 25). Thus, while Laclau 
and Mouffe see a long-term fixation of discourse as impossible, a discourse can 
come to a temporary fixed state through articulations bringing closure. However, 
Laclau and Mouffe stress that the transition from the ”elements” to the ”moments” 
is never entirely fulfilled because ”neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity 
is possible” (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 97). 
The analysis of discursive struggles 
A major aim for this thesis is to examine the discursive struggle taking place over 
what the human security concept should include, in order to reach closure on the 
concept. Jörgensen and Phillips (2002: 29) points to how ”there is always room 
for struggles over what the structure should look like, what discourses should 
prevail, and how meaning should be ascribed to the individual signs”. Thus, the 
focus of this thesis is on the ”essentially contested concepts” that Laclau and 
Mouffe ([1985] 2014) call ”floating signifiers”. Discourse theory offers tools to 
elucidate these discursive struggles, for example by identifying nodal points 
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which specify key points of a specific discourse. Nodal points are ”privileged 
discursive points” (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 98-99) of the partial fixation, 
central signs ”around which the other signs are organised and derive their 
meaning and which exclude other possible meanings” (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 
165-166). Antagonistic viewpoints bring about the discursive struggle of meaning. 
After choosing the nodal points, the researcher looks for the master signifiers 
organizing identity and myths organizing social space, thus bringing clarity to 
various positions within the discourse; “What different understandings of reality 
are at stake, where are they in antagonistic opposition to one another?” (Jörgensen 
& Phillips 2002: 51). It is thus important to analyze how discourses are 
influencing policy which can provide this human security. Hence Laclau and 
Mouffe’s concept of subject position and identity can be used to analyze how the 
identity of the individual human being in need of human security is influenced 
discursively; what is the referent object of security (the individual) to be secured 
from, and in what circumstances?  
 Some points of Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of identity (Jörgensen & 
Phillips 2002: 43) are of special importance for my research questions, and need 
to be clarified in the context of this thesis, understood as a process similar to 
(in)securitization: As a subject acquires its identity by being represented 
discursively, the subject position of the individual in need of human security is 
being discursively represented every time advocates of a certain understanding of 
human security are seeking to hegemonize this particular understanding, through 
discursive articulation. Thus, the identity of the subject in need of human security 
is fragmented as agents of differing conceptions of human security seek to 
determine what the subject position is to be secured from, and what characteristics 
security measures - policy - take. Since the subject is overdetermined, a certain 
conceptualization of human security is always contingent; possible, but not 
always necessary, allowing different conceptualizations of human security to exist 
within different contexts. 
 In the analysis of discursive struggles, it is the combination with other 
signs that gives the key signifiers meaning, through chains of signification; of 
!  11
equivalence/difference (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 50). These chains of meaning 
ultimately strengthen the connections between language and discourse, as they 
elucidate how the key signifiers are rooted in a specific discourse within human 
security. This connection is reinforced by examining the discourses’ surplus of 
meaning, elucidating what is included in the discourse based on what is excluded. 
During my analysis of human security policy documents in chapter 3, I will 
identify the nodal points of the different discourses fighting for influence over 
human security within these documents, and trace their chains of signification to 
structure how the signs are tied together to construct a certain understanding of 
human security, drawing on a specific discourse. As Laclau and Mouffe view 
discourses as seeking to fix a web of meaning in a particular field, the process of 
identifying discursive struggles also elucidates what discourse a specific 
articulation draws on, which shows what discourse it either reproduces or 
challenges. If it challenges a discourse, the articulation will seek to transform an 
existing discourse by redefining some of its moments (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 
29-30). This will be explicit during my analysis of the 2013 Human Security 
report, as I will elaborate on how the articulations made in the report reproduces 
one discourse or conceptualization of human security, while challenging another, 
by redefining its moments. All other possible meanings excluded by a particular 
discourse are surpassed to the surplus of meaning, ”the field of discursivity”; 
”Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to 
arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 
2001: 112). This process is called ”hegemonization”, and will be discussed next.   
Hegemony 
The concept of hegemony can be understood as the organization of consent 
(Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 32), or as ”the expansion of a discourse, or set of 
discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of 
articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context 
crisscrossed by antagonistic forces” (Torfing 1999: 101). While stemming from 
Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe use ”hegemony” in a modified way by not 
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distinguishing between a discursive and a non-discursive field. This brings about 
the fundamental worldview of discourse theory that the perception of reality is 
stemming from discourse, and depends upon the structuring of a discursive field 
(Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2014: 94). Hereby, Laclau and Mouffe do not deny that 
objects exist externally to thought, but argue that their meaning is perceived 
through discursive practice.  
 Discursive hegemony is achieved by relatively stable fixation of the 
meanings of polysemous and contested signifiers around a nodal point. ”The 
practices of articulation through which a given order is created and the meaning of 
social institutions is fixed, are what we call ’hegemonic practices’ […] What is at 
a given moment accepted as the ’natural order’, jointly with the common sense 
that accompanies it, is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices” (Mouffe 
2008: 4). Through these discursive practices and the production of meaning, 
power relations can become almost naturalized through hegemonic interventions 
(Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 48). This will be visible during my analysis of the 
2013 Human Security report, elucidating the hegemonic conceptualization of 
human security, and how hegemonic interventions are performed in order to 
reproduce or exclude certain understandings of human security, to reach closure 
on the concept. As this process of ”hegemonization” excludes other possible 
meanings, the other meanings are appointed to the field of discursivity. The way 
my thesis uses and understands the meaning of ”hegemony” in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s terms, should therefore not be confused with understandings of 
hegemony in a traditional ”top-down”-sense. Instead, it should be understood as 
the structuring and temporary fixation of meaning in a discourse which excludes 
other meanings. ”Power is not understood as something which people possess and 
exercises over others, but as that which produces the social […] power produces 
an inhabitable world for us, and, on the other hand, it precludes alternative 
possibilities” (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 37). 
 Hegemonization is most effective on ambivalent signifiers existing 
simultaneously in different discourses. The signifier ”vulnerable” exists in both 
”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want”, but are connected to respective 
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discourse’s nodal point in different ways. Therefore, hegemonization of the 
signifier ”vulnerable” through articulation transforms the sign from polysemic to 
fixed, as its meaning is tied to a specific understanding of human security. 
However, in line with the arguments made by Swales (1990), the wider discursive 
field where human security constitutes a floating signifier makes human security 
”up for grabs”, as different hegemonizing discourses attempt to conscript and 
appropriate it, by using the concept tendentiously and opportunistically in 
contexts that constrain their inherent meaning potential and align it with the 
broader values and interest of the discourse and the discourse community or 
interest group that it serves (Rear & Jones 2014: 10-11). Thus, while the meaning 
of the sign ”vulnerable” is relatively stable within a human development 
discourse, it is constituting a floating signifier within a wider discourse on human 
security which includes signs from both a more traditional discourse of security 
and a human development discourse. Since ”human security” is essentially the 
contested signifier which the two discourses seek to hegemonize, it also 
constitutes a floating signifier. Going back to the constructivist underpinnings of 
this thesis, that security is essentially a social construction, also ”security” is thus 
an example of an expression that is often used in ways that seem consensual, but 
is in essence highly dependent on what it relates to. Therefore, the expression 
”security” can be incoherent and sometimes even contradictory; ”[s]uch semiotic 
disconnection is especially likely to happen when circulating referring expressions 
are entextualized, particularly in institutional discourses, and when the 
phenomena in reference to which they are used are complex, fluid and 
indeterminate” (Urciuoli 2010: 48). 
1.4.3. Combining aspects of discourse theory and critical discourse 
analysis into an analytical framework 
I will now present how the combination of concepts from Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory such as articulations and chains of equivalence with Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analytical concepts intertextuality, interdiscursivity and order of 
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discourse create an empirically grounded framework making these analytical tools 
stronger in concert (Jörgensen and Phillips 2002: 56). The intention is to focus on 
an ”essentially contested concept” that Laclau and Mouffe calls a ”floating 
signifier”; the concept of human security. Thus, my analytical framework is 
constructed similarly to how Rear and Jones (2014) apply a combination of the 
two methods in their analysis of education policy. Rear and Jones theorize 
policymaking by using Taylor’s definition, as ”an arena of struggle over meaning” 
(Taylor 2004: 435) - a definition also suitable for this thesis’ understanding of the 
struggle over human security as a concept and policy.   
Intertextual analysis in order to identify different discourses within documents 
While articulations can help identify various conceptions of human security in 
order to find the different discourses the documents draw upon, consciously or 
unconsciously, we need to be able to showcase the existence of such a discourse 
beyond the text under scrutiny. This can be achieved through an intertextual 
analysis, by identifying the nodal points and moments within the analyzed text, 
and how these are related to previous texts. Intertextuality means that no text can 
be understood in isolation, but has to be understood in relation to other similar 
texts; ”Intertextuality is basically the property texts have of being full of snatches 
of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the 
text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth” (Fairclough 1992: 
84). Examining texts intertextually, we also come across the aspect of 
interdiscursivity, by identifying what discourses the texts draw on (Jörgensen & 
Phillips 2002: 82). These concepts are designed to study change in discourse, in a 
similar way as Laclau and Mouffe’s articulations bring on discursive change. 
Even if an articulation is reproducing a discourse, ”[e]very discursive practice is 
an articulation since no practice is an exact repetition of earlier structures. Every 
apparent reproduction involves an element of change, however minimal. Like 
Fairclough’s concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity, ’articulation’ 
encapsulates the point that discursive practice both draws on, and destabilises, 
earlier patterns” (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 140).  
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 Identifying discourses through the application and use of key signifiers in 
a text reveal the discursive struggle by analyzing how meaning are ascribed to 
these signifiers. By using discourse theory’s term for a contested sign - a floating 
signifier - an analyst can thus trace the chains of signification constituting this 
floating signifier, and hereby reveal how meaning is ascribed to the floating 
signifier in different discourses, drawing on the intertextuality between texts. 
Articulatory processes bring about the reinforcement or the dissolution of a 
certain meaning for the contested sign, through hegemonic intervention leading to 
closure. Using intertextuality as a comparison strategy elucidates in what ways the 
text under study is different from other texts, what consequences it has, which 
understanding of the world that is taken for granted, and which understandings 
that are ignored (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 149).   
”Order of discourse”; the study’s approach to the surplus of meaning 
Since ”the field of discursivity” can provide an overwhelming amount of 
alternative conceptions to be found in the discourse’s surplus, this study makes 
use of Jörgensen and Phillips (2002: 27) suggestion and combines this aspect of 
discourse theory with Fairclough’s critical discourse analytical concept ”order of 
discourse”. ”Order of discourse” denotes a limited range of discourses which 
struggles in the same terrain, such as various conceptions of security, thus 
providing a more manageable and relevant surplus of meaning. ”Order of 
discourse” can be fruitfully combined with discourse theory because not all 
possibilities are equally likely in a given situation. Since Laclau and Mouffe do 
not acknowledge this aspect of likelihood, ”an order of discourse denotes a group 
of discourses that operate in the same social terrain - both in conflict and in 
concordance with one another” (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 57). It is therefore my 
intention to map human security’s ”order of discourse” by presenting how various 
discourses relating to human security are struggling to fix meaning in competing 
ways. This will be visible during the analysis of human security policy in chapter 
3. In the analysis of the 2013 Human Security report in chapter 4, I will point to 
the different discourses previously identified. I will show how a certain 
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understanding of human security is reproduced, by identifying how the 
articulations in the report categorize certain aspects essential for one 
conceptualization as part of the discourse, while others - belonging to a different 
discourse - are seen as outside of the discourse, and thus surpassed to the order of 
discourse. 
Motivation of choice of method 
While chapter 2 share characteristics of a conceptual history, a pure choice of 
method based in concept analysis would not be ideal for the thesis’ aims. Instead, 
the theoretical overview will present opportunities for a discursive analysis 
combining discourse theory and aspects of CDA, as my discourse theoretical 
framework is designed to identify the discursive struggle for human security. 
Thus, my choice of analytical tools allows me to go deeper into the documents 
under scrutiny, in order to elucidate how the years of differing interpretations are 
influencing a common understanding of human security and its implementation 
within the UN. In essence, this thesis is interested in the analysis of the referent 
object, or subject position, of human security; the individual human being in need 
of security. Therefore, this subject position is constantly overdetermined (to refer 
to Laclau and Mouffe), in the sense that there are a vast array of threats posed 
against the security of the subject position. It is my intention to analyze how 
different conceptualizations of human security, influenced by different discourses, 
are trying to pin down the subject position of human security; i.e. what is the 
subject position of security to be secured from, and under what circumstances? 
Since the two main approaches within human security differ in their view of 
”threat perception”, it is the essential task for this thesis to analyze how ”freedom 
from fear” and ”freedom from want” are engaged in a discursive struggle over the 
meaning of human security.  
 In this struggle, both approaches seek to hegemonize their view of human 
security through hegemonic intervention which eventually will lead to closure on 
the concept. Used in such fashion, discourse theory ”takes its lead from 
interpretative methods of social inquiry in which emphasis is placed on 
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understanding and explaining the emergence and logic of discourses, and the 
socially constructed identities they confer upon social agents” (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis 2000: 10). Thus, if the social agent is the individual human being in 
need of human security; how are discourses influencing policy which can provide 
this human security? Discourse analytical concepts and tools such as articulations, 
intertextuality, discursive struggle, hegemony, antagonism and order of discourse 
will all contribute to this process in a way that I do not see other choices of 
method being as suitable for. The analysis of the fluctuating nature of human 
security points to the element of partial fixation of human security; it is a concept 
which has been ascribed a variety of meanings. Therefore, a method based in 
discourse theory is well suited to analyze these partial fixations. 
1.5. Delimitations and justification of material 
While there are several understandings of how to interpret human security, I have 
chosen to focus on ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” since these are 
the most profiled conceptions over the last decades. Besides prominent books 
written within security studies, Chapter 2 will mainly draw on scientific texts and 
articles from article databases such as JSTOR, Ebrary and Scopus, as material 
from such sources strengthens the reliability of the material, considering the 
verifiability of such sources. Since Japan is the main advocator of human security 
as ”freedom from want”, whereas Canada (especially) and Norway are the two 
main advocators of ”freedom from fear”, the policy documents in chapter 3 will 
mainly be originating from the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian 
government, as well as the Norwegian political life. The material for analysis in 
chapter 4 consists of the 2013 Human Security report from the United Nations 
Secretary General. 
Motivating the choice of material, chapter 2 utilizes texts written within the 
field of International Relations (IR) and its sub-discipline Security Studies. A 
variety of material is scrutinized to identify trends influencing the conceptual 
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debate of security in general, and human security in particular, focusing on 
scholars both within traditional and critical approaches. The literature on human 
security under scrutiny consists of texts written by human security advocates such 
as Picciotto and Kaldor, but also by scholars who sees some question marks 
attached to the concept, such as Paris. The material used to identify the main 
trends influencing human security is purposefully wide in scope, a decision made 
in order to include as large a quantity of relevant material as possible, to make 
sure to present a comprehensive understanding of the different views influencing 
human security. On the other hand, the material in chapters 3 and 4 will be subject 
to a closer discourse analysis, therefore that material can be considered ”narrow 
and safe” (Esaiasson 2012: 220-221). 
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2. The evolution of human security: 
locating human security in theory and 
practice  
This chapter will present a quick overview of the main trends influencing 
contemporary security studies, by first discussing traditional security theory, and 
then move on to non-traditional approaches, broadening the meaning of security. 
Later, I will turn to the role of human security within the new security landscape. 
2.1. Traditional vs. non-traditional security theory 
The traditional realist perspective within International Relations (IR) has been the 
dominant perspective of security in international politics for the last decades 
(Morgan 2007: 16), and the state centric focus of traditional security thinking can 
be traced to the peace of Westphalia in 1648, and the birth of the nation state. It 
was from this point onwards that states slowly took the place of religion as the 
central point of social identity in a new world order (Campbell 1998: 40-46; 
Hettne 2010: 35-37). With the emergence of states, intra-state sources of conflict 
changed to inter-state conflicts. Within this approach, security is seen from a 
westernized or Eurocentric realist perspective, and the referent object of security 
is the state (Baldwin 1997; Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 331; Jackson 2008: 374). The 
Hobbesian tradition is strong within the realist perspective and the theory of the 
social contract between the state and its people is still referred to in different fields 
of security studies (see Campbell 1998; Krause & Williams 1997; Morgan 2007). 
Hobbes’ theory of the social contract elaborates on how the state offers protection 
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for its citizens in exchange for legitimacy, as the state is the ultimate provider of 
security for its inhabitants within its territory. This also makes security in the 
traditional realist perspective a matter of absolute sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs, as security is a matter for the state alone (Herring 
2007). The focus of traditional security is on physical violence, and military 
threats to the state, even though there are different conceptions of security also 
within the realist perspective, such as neo-realism and ”offensive” and 
”defensive” realists (proponents of either expansionism or defensive conduct by 
states, see Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, inter-state military conflict and physical 
violence are the point of focus in traditional realist security. 
Critical Security: shifting the referent object of security 
As a response to the state-centric realist perspective, contemporary security 
studies holds several non-traditional and critical approaches to security, mainly 
influenced by constructivist and post-modernist scholars such as Derrida and 
Foucault. The state still holds a prominent position within many critical 
approaches, however, the role of the state is treated differently compared to 
traditional security theory. While the realist view of security advocates a ”static” 
view of security, critical security scholars argue that security needs to be 
contextually sensitive and is highly dependent on changing circumstances (Krause 
& Williams 1997; Mutimer 2007). A good example is Richard Ullman’s 
influential article ”Redefining Security” from 1983, in which he argued that the 
military focus of security would obstruct the realization that non-military threats 
could have a deterring effect on nations (Ullman 1983: 130). Ullman argued that 
nation states can constitute a threat towards its own population, pointing to how 
Hobbes’ theory of the social contract could work in reverse. In the 1990s several 
critical approaches followed in the footsteps of Ullman, emphasizing the need to 
acknowledge changing circumstances in the range of threats (see Collins 2007; 
Hettne 2010; Sheehan 2005: 56ff). As I discussed in chapter 1.4, Krause and 
Williams advocate a broader interpretation of critical security studies (adequately 
labelled Critical Security Studies), which was introduced in 1997 as a 
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theoretically inclusive approach. Even though Critical Security Studies include 
different schools and traditions, efforts have been made to further specify what 
Critical Security Studies should hold, with a specific focus on the constructivist 
nature of security. The Aberystwyth (or Welsh) School, however, downplays the 
constructivist focus by instead linking security to critical theory, focusing on 
human emancipation. As other critical approaches they criticize the traditional 
realist state centric assumptions of the sovereign state as the main provider of 
security - instead, they see states as a potential cause for insecurity, a notion 
evident in many critical security perspectives (Mutimer 2007: 62-65; Wyn Jones 
2001: 5-10).  
 Also the Copenhagen School seeks to broaden the conception of security, 
as their theory of “securitization” explains how non-military issues can be 
considered matters of security, even if they are not posing a direct threat to the 
state. This process occurs when an actor presents an issue as an existential threat 
towards an objects survival, and ”securitizes” the issue through a speech-act, but 
does not presuppose the existence of an objective threat (Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde 1998; Emmers 2007: 111-113). The idea of securitization was further 
developed by the Paris school. Advocating a constructionist approach (Baylis 
2008: 162-171), the Paris school argues that security is the result of 
(in)securitization. Paris scholar Didier Bigo stresses that speech acts alone are 
insufficient when addressing security, and emphasizes the need to also 
acknowledge how ”(in)security” professionals utilize technology and strategy 
when framing threats to security. These professionals are not limited to powerful 
actors such as politicians or the military sector, but also includes intermediary 
actors such as intelligence agencies or private companies (Bigo 2008: 125-127). 
According to Bigo, the concept of ”security” is being fought over by these 
(in)security professionals, and its definition depends on the differing opinions of 
what is the most urgent existential security threat worthy of securitizing. While 
this process is reminiscent of the Copenhagen School’s securitization act, there 
are some differences. As the process of securitization needs the public’s approval, 
the process of (in)securitization is often carried out unknowingly to the public, as 
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a part of the process of Governmentality (Bigo 2008). The process of 
(in)securitization can be seen to take place when actors talk about human security, 
thus framing it as a subject position in need of securitizing against a certain 
perception of threats - which brings us to the discussion about human security. 
2.1.1. Human security 
Human security differentiates itself from traditional state-centric approaches by 
putting the individual as the referent object of security, thus basing its definition 
of security on human-centric arguments. That is not to say that human security 
discard the importance of state-security, but human security argues that state-
centric realism is insufficient to explain and meet the security challenges posed in 
a post-Cold War era, stressing the need to meet insecurities both between and 
within states. As a theoretical approach, Newman (2010: 90) describes how 
human security is being consequentialist while critical security studies are 
structurally revisionist, pointing to how critical approaches to security tend to 
challenge the epistemological and ontological assumptions of realism (Newman 
2010: 83-84). Since human security takes many of the existing structures and 
institutions for granted, much for policy reasons, critical security scholars often 
see human security as “uncritical” and less sophisticated than other critical 
approaches within security studies. 
 The concept gained increasing attention as a part of the UNDP’s 1994 
Human Development Report, which was the result of the scholarship by economic 
scholar Mahbub ul Haq (Kerr 2007; Tadjbakhsh 2009). The UNDP report 
describes human security as an approach that not only addresses the results but 
also the root-causes for human insecurities, and as a bridging approach between 
security and development given the explicit link between (human) security and 
(human) development (Werthes & Debiel 2006). In the report human security is 
advocated to constitute the backbone of a new development paradigm, and ul Haq 
expressed how human security could be achieved through development, not 
through arms (UNDP 1994: chapter 2; ul Haq 1995: 115). At its core the concept 
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consists of the two foundational freedoms outlined in the 1945 adoption of the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ”freedom from fear” and 
freedom from want” (UNDHR). In this sense, human security is a 
multidimensional framework including matters of rights, security, development 
and humanitarian concerns, which at the same time are dynamic and sensitive to 
the changing nature and realities of insecurity. Thus, the concept was designed 
focusing on inclusiveness, and the UNDP report explained the seemingly 
ambiguous concept by stating; ”Like other fundamental concepts […] human 
security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence. And most 
people instinctively understand what security means”, and offers a more explicit 
definition, by stating that human security means ”first, safety from such chronic 
threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from 
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in 
jobs or in communities” (UNDP 1994: 23). The report defined human security 
according to seven dimensions; personal, environmental, economic, political, 
community, health and food security (UNDP 1994: 24-25). 
2.1.1.1. Divisions within human security: an introduction to 
”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” 
The conceptual debate within human security can be categorized as a narrow 
school and a broad school, or as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want”. 
This distinction is a general categorization of the two main conceptualizations 
influencing human security on a discursive level, and has been referred to and 
identified by for example Acharya (2001), Kerr (2007) and Tadjbakhsh (2009) 
among several others. These conceptualizations of human security are not viewed 
as completely mutually exclusive, however, they are constituted by several 
differences, and can be understood as competing for the hegemonic understanding 
of human security. The definition discussed so far, drawing on the work of ul Haq, 
is often understood as constituting the ”broader school” of human security, 
labelled “freedom from want”. This approach see human security not only as 
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”freedom from fear” but also as ”freedom from want”. Still, there are scholars 
advocating a narrow understanding of human security, as ”freedom from fear”, an 
expression stemming from foundational human rights treaties (Spigelman 2010). 
It defines human security as protection from violence and physical aggression, 
emphasizing ”direct threats to individuals’ safety and their physical integrity: 
armed conflict, human rights abuses, public insecurity and organized crime” 
Tadjbakhsh (2009: 1). 
 The previous discussion serves as an introduction to the differences 
between the two main conceptualizations of human security, and constitutes an 
overarching guide to the following discussion on the discursive struggle for 
human security. I will now continue to explore these varying conceptions, by 
discussing how a changed security landscape influences the discursive struggle 
for human security. 
2.2. Characteristics of the new security landscape and 
its implications 
It is widely believed that the security climate has changed in the last decades, 
especially since the end of the Cold War. States as well as individuals are facing 
new kinds of threats for their survival, and I will now elaborate on what is 
believed to be new with the ”new security landscape”. This chapter will provide 
answers to why traditional conceptions of security are no longer enough - why 
there is a need for human security - and showcase what context the concept of 
human security has originated from as well as evolved in. 
From an inter- towards an intrastate logic 
The nature of armed conflicts around the world saw a change after the end of 
World War 2, as interstate wars were surpassed by intrastate wars as the most 
common type of conflict. This is illustrated in Appendix 1, showing numbers from 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on armed conflicts by type between 
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1946-2013. The UCDP defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between 
two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 1). The statistics shows a vast 
increase of intrastate conflicts after 1945 peaking in the early 1990s, as interstate 
conflicts experienced an uneven but relatively steady decline (Appendix 1). In its 
definition, the UCDP includes the government of a state as one essential part of a 
conflict. However, the line between state- and non-state actors is becoming 
increasingly blurred in the contemporary security landscape. Statistics from the 
Vancouver-based Human Security Research Group show trends in post-Cold War 
assaults on civilians, but also elucidates conflicts where governments have a 
downplayed role, pondering the question if organized criminal violence is 
becoming a greater threat than war (HSRP 2013: 7). Crime and war are 
increasingly intertwined in contemporary conflicts, and while pointing to how 
many conflicts stem from ethnic and religious cleavages, Mittelman (2012: 230) 
argues that they often, at least in part, can be explained by fighting deriving from 
criminal activity.   
 However, while civil wars are potential breeding grounds for organized 
criminal violence, governments still play an important role in the new security 
landscape. Stokke explains the peak in intrastate conflicts in the early 1990s by 
pointing to how the post-Cold War world order caused imminent conflicts based 
in nationalism to break out. These conflicts are often seen as ”typical examples” 
of post-Cold War conflicts, and includes the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, 
the Horn of Africa, southern Sudan and the Great Lakes region in Central Africa 
(Stokke 2009: 424). It is believed that such conflicts were aggravated by the 
increasing second-hand weapon trade, as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact at the 
end of the Cold War caused a downsizing of official arms stocks. Small-arms and 
other weapons became readily available for guerrilla groups or other factions in 
civil wars, hence sustaining the intrastate conflicts of the last decades (Picciotto et 
al. 2007: 97-98). The targeting of civilians by various fighting groups is 
increasingly seen in today’s intrastate conflicts, purposely forcing the people to 
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realize that the sitting regime no longer can provide security. The aim is to rally 
opposition against the regime which undermines state legitimacy and forces 
regime change (Karlsson 2004: 107-109). 
Threats without a passport 
The new security landscape is also characterized by ”threats without a passport”, 
as Mahbub ul Haq used this metaphor to illustrate how consequences of poverty - 
such as drugs, AIDS, pollution and terrorism -  cannot be stopped by borders, but 
will ”travel without a passport” (ul Haq 1995: 115). ul Haq saw it to be a global 
responsibility to safeguard individuals, an opinion shared by Kaldor, declaring 
how ”[t]he kind of security that Americans and Europeans expect to enjoy at 
home has to spread to the rest of the world […] The world is interconnected 
through social media, transportation, and basic human sympathy. In other words, 
human security is about the blurring of the domestic and the 
international” (Kaldor 2012: 5). Thus, the securitization of transnational threats 
such as international terrorism, infectious disease and transnational crime 
elucidates how insecurity is increasingly stemming from sources other than nation 
states (Jackson 2008: 378-386), which questions the adequacy of a solely 
traditional realist perspective of security.  
 Using Al-Qaeda as a case in point, Barkawi and Laffey stresses how 
”Southern” resistance movements becomes increasingly global in their formation. 
While such groups used to rebel against colonialism or an oppressive rule, they 
are no longer restricted to nations or regions (Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 330), 
which forces a re-thinking of security relations. The spread of technology through 
globalization is benefitting these organizations, which can be likened to modern, 
transnational corporations (Kurzman 2012: 394). Currently, in Iraq and Syria the 
group known as the Islamic State (IS) is now being treated as a global security 
concern. The United States’ vice president Joe Biden illustrated the ”threats 
without a passport”-characteristic of the new security landscape, claiming that IS 
(or ISIL) is on par with the Ebola virus in terms of global security concerns, 
warning that ”threats as diverse as terrorism and pandemic disease” are crossing 
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borders at ”blinding speed” (CNN 2014a). As the administration received critique 
for the way several security threats were treated in its early stages, among them 
the Ebola crisis as well as the threat posed by the IS (NY Times 2014), it was 
made public in November 2014 that the United States’ Defense Secretary Chuck 
Hagel intended to step down, as the administration recognized that a different skill 
set was required to meet the threat posed by IS. This is another example of how 
the effects of changing threats force traditional agents of security to adjust. 
Change of actors involved 
Non-state actors play a bigger role in conflicts today, both directly and indirectly. 
In the first camp we find a difference in the constitution of the fighting parties, as 
many conflicts today include a variety of actors partaking in what can be likened 
to guerrilla warfare. Examples are private security forces (sometimes thought of 
as a ”re-privatization of war”, see Karlsson 2004: 113) and other paramilitary 
groups, as well as an increase in groups tied to traditional and religious leaders 
(Karlsson 2004: 113-114). The conflict in Syria is one example of a conflict 
involving, besides the Syrian military, a myriad of actors not easily distinguished; 
the diverse Syrian opposition, the Free Syrian Army, Jihadist groups and the 
Hezbollah, along with the presence of IS (CBC 2014; CNN, 2014b). In the ”new 
wars” (Kaldor 2007), complex alliances are formed which makes it hard to 
distinguish who is siding with whom. Similarly, there are signs that the conflict in 
Syria has turned into a sectarian conflict, and while the biggest sectarian divide is 
between the Sunni and the Allawite communities, also other minority groups have 
seen increasing involvement in the conflict (Tveit 2013; Lekic 2012; Mestou 
2012). Thus, the conflict in Syria can be understood as what Kaldor (2007) calls a 
”new war”; highly pronounced ethnic nationalistic signatures, based in identity 
disparities; widespread and systematic killings of ”the other”; identity politics are 
used to gain and reinforce power (e.g. Alawite support to Assad despite discontent 
with the regime, see Baker 2013). According to Kaldor, the logic of the new wars 
is more about claiming identity than about claiming territory, and she points to 
how the war in Bosnia Hercegovina between 1992 and 1995 is a typical example 
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of a new war (Kaldor 2007: 7, 33ff). The Yugoslav wars in the 1990s elucidate 
one of the main characteristics of modern conflict and the ”new wars”, that the 
casualties are overwhelmingly civilian and non-combatants (Kaldor 2007: 33ff; 
Bellamy & Williams 2006: 144-145). Some of the most violent modern conflicts 
are based on claiming ethnicity and identity through ethnic cleansing (as seen in 
Rwanda, Kosovo, Sudan etc.), which has led to increase civilian casualties 
(Karlsson 2004: 115). In October 2014 the UN Special Envoy for Syria compared 
the situation in the Syrian city of Kobane to the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 
(SES 2014). 
 Various NGOs are an example of actors playing an indirect role in modern 
conflict. Relating to the divisions between humanitarianism and realism seen in 
the contemporary security debate, de Jong Oudraat and Haufler (2012: 333) 
contribute the success of the Ban the Landmine campaign to how various NGOs 
strategically reframed the issue, and “transformed” it from a military security 
issue to a humanitarian concern. This points to the transnational influence in the 
security debate, as well as to the tension between humanism and realism within 
security discourse. The promotion of policies to ban Landmines is a subject 
traditionally advocated by proponents of the approach of human security as 
”freedom from fear” (see Kilgour 1999). This further acknowledges the notion 
that traditional security no longer is sufficient to meet the challenges of a changed 
security landscape. I will now discuss how a security discourse based in 
humanitarianism has evolved in this landscape, and what implications the new 
security landscape has had on the development of human security.  
2.3. Ensuring human security in the new security 
landscape: humanitarian intervention and the ICISS’ 
”responsibility to protect” 
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The end of the Cold War saw hope for the birth of a new world order promoting 
human rights and democracy. It was believed that the international community 
(and especially Western states) had a responsibility for bringing such values, and 
protect people in other areas of the world, making the use of military force a 
moral duty (Karlsson 2004: 117). A post-national logic emerged where human 
security was contrasted to traditional state security (Hettne 2010; Pattison 2008). 
Thus, the 1990s is considered an important time that promoted tools to further 
ensure human security through humanitarian intervention, and to an extent 
combining development and security matters (Ewan 2007; Hussein et al. 2004: 
11; Molier 2006; Waddell 2006: 535).   
 While the United Nations Security Council has legal right to authorize 
humanitarian intervention in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
topic is still surrounded by much debate. The current situation in Syria has 
sparked much contestation between different camps within the Security Council 
concerning when humanitarian crisis should trigger armed intervention. Military 
intervention without the approval of the Security Council has in some cases been 
viewed as ”illegal but legitimate”; the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo did not 
have the blessing of the Security Council, but was approved on moral grounds 
(Bellamy 2005: 35). Kosovo came to signify a watershed moment in humanitarian 
intervention (ICISS 2001: vii), and it has since been argued that the principle of 
sovereignty cannot excuse genocide and crimes against humanity. The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was 
formed in September 2000 under the sponsorship of the Canadian government. In 
December 2001 the ICISS published the report The Responsibility to Protect 
(ICISS 2001). After the troubling circumstances in both Rwanda and Kosovo 
where the international response was characterized by slow moving negotiations 
and disagreement on the course of action, the ICISS report was put together to 
offer guidelines to humanitarian intervention (see Appendix 2). The purpose was 
to prevent policymakers from being tangled up in time consuming discussions 
about human rights on the one hand and state sovereignty on the other. Instead, 
the principle of responsibility to protect (”R2P”) should be activated, and the 
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international community should legitimately intervene if a state proved ”unwilling 
or unable” to fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens (ICISS 2001: xi). The 
difficulty, however, with R2P has been the judgement over when the transfer of 
”responsibility to protect” from host state to the Security Council is justified, and 
there is a lack of consensus regarding when this threshold is crossed (see Wheeler 
2000).  
 When the principle of R2P finally was adopted by the General Assembly 
in 2005, it was revised, and not as firm of a principle as the ICISS report had 
proposed. However, the main principle remained and was stipulated into three 
pillars. States carry the primary responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide and war crimes, and the international community should encourage 
individual states to carry out this responsibility. If states failed to do so, the 
responsibility to protect falls on the international community, adopting measures 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN: The Responsibility to 
Protect; United Nations Charter). Thus, R2P emphasizes mechanisms of conflict 
prevention and support (pillars one and two), but also acknowledges coercive 
force under Chapter VII as a final destination (pillar three). It was utilized as a 
legitimator for military interventions for the first time in 2011, when the Security 
Council applied the principle of R2P in the conflict in Libya to mandate aerial 
intervention. While proponents saw the intervention as necessary, Russia and 
China claimed that the principle of R2P was misused in order to achieve regime 
change in Libya. Russia proclaimed the willingness to use its veto in the Security 
Council to prevent future intervention, if the unbiasedness of the international 
community could not be guaranteed. This has been evident in the ongoing conflict 
in Syria, as both Russia and China stopped several resolutions using their veto 
(Morris 2013: 1274-1275).   
 Claims of misuse of human security discourse and fears of arbitrary 
intervention have been increasingly creeping up after the terrorist attacks on the 
United States in 2001, which will be elaborated on next.  
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The humanitarian turn coming to an end post-9/11: the moral aspect of 
humanitarian intervention 
While some scholars predicted an even greater convergence of human and 
national security at the time for the attacks (see Liotta 2002), a turn in that 
discourse is widely recognized after 9/11, with increasing focus on unipolarity and 
unilateralism (see Duffield 2006; Hobden 2008; Liotta 2005; Molier 2006; Rogers 
2007). The discourse shifted from ”humanitarian intervention” to ”pre-emptive 
intervention” and ”war against terrorism” (Hettne 2010: 45). While 9/11 illustrates 
a typical threat in the new security landscape - carried out by a non-state actor, use 
of unconventional force, targeting civilians - many scholars point to how the 
response to these attacks was based in traditional security discourse, by declaring 
war on a foreign nation state. Some saw this as a way to recapture the traditional 
security discourse (McDonald 2002: 290) considering the importance of state-
legitimization in traditional realist security thinking. The following ”war on 
terror” is frequently believed to showcase the problems with meeting non-
traditional security matters with solutions based in traditional security discourse, 
and its potential moral dilemmas. For example, Piciotto argues that the 
interventions in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003, while using humanitarian 
rhetoric, ”were not initially motivated by a desire to address the deep-rooted 
conflicts of these societies” (Piciotto et al. 2007: 211). 
 This moral aspect of humanitarian intervention has seen frequent debate 
post-9/11, in a context of ”war on terror”, and regarding the question ”whose 
responsibility to protect”. Within this debate Bellamy (2005) identifies two 
conceptions of humanitarian intervention; as ”responsibility to protect” or as a 
”Trojan horse”. The ethical perspective is seen in a debate about ”norm-carriers”, 
and states engaging in humanitarian intervention are judged by their earlier track-
record. Bellamy (2005: 32-33) argues that the United States and the United 
Kingdom lost some credibility as norm-carriers after the 2003 intervention in Iraq, 
which hurt these states’ possibilities to take future action and to form future 
coalitions. Thus, the Western state conglomerate (to refer to Shaw 2000: 199ff), 
faced declining moral legitimacy after the invasion in Iraq, which can constitute a 
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credibility crisis for strong advocates of humanitarian intervention. Declining 
legitimacy can seriously delay or even hinder humanitarian intervention since 
questions are raised over where morality lies (which actor has the moral 
responsibility to protect?), and which moral assumptions should underpin 
decisions regarding intervention (Bellamy 2005: 33). Just as the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo was seen as a breaking point in the norms of humanitarian 
intervention, Rengger (2002) describes the events on 9/11 as another breaking 
point, but in a different way. He argues that Western states came to treat the just 
war tradition as a ”luxury” they could no longer afford, thus also relating to the 
discussion surrounding Bellamy’s Trojan Horse-argument. This implies that 
humanitarian intervention and the principle of R2P could be utilized unethically, a 
discussion I will touch on more next, in relation to human security.   
2.3.1. What implications does human security have for humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P? 
The principle of R2P is not only debated within traditional approaches to security, 
favoring sovereignty and non-interventionism, but has also seen antagonistic 
debate within human security. While humanitarian intervention is a notion close to 
the Canadian advocacy of ”freedom from fear”, advocates of ”freedom from 
want” argue that if the justification of interventions in conflicts is based on its 
implications for international stability, it might lead to a prioritization of conflicts 
deemed strategically more important to international order. There is a risk that 
potentially more deadly and violent conflicts are overlooked if they are considered 
as having lesser implications for international stability (Kerr 2007: 97). The way 
the principles of R2P have been put into practice has seen criticism on these 
grounds, for example in relation to the lack of action taken in Darfur (see Bellamy 
& Williams 2006, Ben Simon 2008). The argument that R2P makes sovereignty 
conditional has been put forth by the developing world and the G77 (a critique the 
G77 already pointed against the concept of human security at the Copenhagen 
Summit in 1995; see Tadjbakhsh 2009: 4), and that R2P can be utilized by 
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powerful states as a way into internal affairs of weaker states (Kerr 2007: 98; 
Shaw 2000: 261). Use of human security rhetoric leading to humanitarian 
intervention can be related to “securitization”. Development issues can be used as 
a pretext for security concerns if powerful international actors see 
underdevelopment as a security threat to their own national, as well as to global, 
security, showcasing the imbalance of the so called security-development nexus 
(see Barkawi & Laffey 2006; Beall et al. 2006; Dóchas 2007; Duffield 2006). 
Similarly, while some view the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo as ”illegal but 
legitimate”, Noam Chomsky (1999) challenges the ”New Humanism” by labeling 
it the ”New Military Humanism” in his analysis of the NATO bombings. 
Chomsky reveals how selective the intervention in human rights violations are, 
and ponders the question if it is guided by power interest rather than humanitarian 
concern. This is one clear divide between the different conceptions of human 
security, as ”freedom from fear”, emphasizing intervention to put an end to 
internal violence, is sometimes looked at with suspicion by developing countries 
and proponents of ”freedom from want”. 
 The criticism emanating from ”freedom from want” against R2P has 
increased in the post-9/11 security landscape, as the so called ”Bush-doctrine” 
saw greater influence. This foreign policy, emphasizing pre-emptive intervention 
as a mean to secure the United States, saw criticism for reducing the normative 
significance of sovereignty. While some scholars foresaw an increasing number of 
interventions, a contrasting view emerged which claimed that the ”sun has set” on 
the humanitarian interventionist agenda. This view questioned the humanitarian 
argument to justify the U.S. invasion in Iraq, and argued that it made R2P and 
humanitarian intervention even more prone to accusations of being abused. 
According to human rights groups these events also hampers the U.S.’s ability to 
justify future military intervention (Bellamy 2005: 37-39; Kaldor 2007: 120). In 
Darfur, for example, the call for responsibility to protect the people of Darfur 
came mainly from human rights groups, Western journalists and some states, but 
it was harder to pinpoint upon whom this responsibility lay. To be sure to not take 
on any obligations, many core Western states were careful to suggest the Sudanese 
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government’s inability or unwillingness to fulfill that responsibility (to relate to 
the ICISS report). Sudanese actors warned that foreign (as in non-African) 
intervention risked causing another situation similar to the one in Iraq. The 
Sudanese government referred to a potential Western intervention as a Trojan 
horse, drawing parallels between U.S. activism in Darfur and Iraq (Bellamy 2005: 
42-48). Such rhetoric was seen both before and after the intervention in Iraq (see 
CNN 2013a; CNN 2013b), again pointing to the weakened credibility of Western 
coalitions in matters of humanitarian intervention. Here, the statement of Hannah 
Arendt holds true, that power rests on legitimacy, not on violence (Arendt 1979: 
50-51). While a humanitarian intervention is different to a classic military 
intervention, since it is built within an international mandate and the framework of 
international law (Kaldor 2012: 12), several scholars argue that the 2011 
intervention in Libya once again showcased the problems with humanitarian 
intervention.  
The 2011 intervention in Libya; a missed opportunity for human security 
mainstreaming? 
According to Morris ”Libya has served as less a showcase for the potential of R2P 
and more as a warning of its dangers” (Morris 2013: 1280). He argues that the 
intervention further spurred the suspicion against Western powers use of force to 
violate the sovereignty of weaker states, and points to the aftermath reactions of 
the BRICS, and especially the propensity for Russia and China to block future 
R2P-initiatives. Looking back, the conflict in Libya was in many ways a test case 
for human security in peace operations, after the commitment in 2010 from the 
UN Secretary General and the United Nations system to mainstream human 
security (Kettemann 2011). However, Kettemann’s findings show how the 
preventive focus of the human security agenda in the case of Libya ended up 
creating a ”conflict gap” which R2P in its current state is unable to fill. Going 
forward, Kettemann stresses the need to mainstream human security within peace 
operations, by including human security also at the conflict-level, not only at a 
pre- and post-conflict level. Relating to how the original principle of R2P from 
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2001 was revised, Kettemann points to how none of the original principles (see 
Appendix 2) for military intervention made it in to the ”watered down” R2P 
outcome document. For example, the ”just cause threshold”, the ”right intention”, 
”last resort” or ”reasonable prospect”, are all original R2P principles closely 
related to the narrow conceptualization of human security as ”freedom from fear”. 
Kettemann states how ”[e]xcluding human security in peace operations thus 
means blocking one of the channels through which principles dear to the original 
conception of the responsibility to protect may flow” (Kettemann 2011: 46). He 
argues that if human security was mainstreamed into the UNSC resolutions before 
they were adopted, a better strategy could have been utilized and the abstaining 
states could have been joining the majority vote. Kettemann suggests a checklist 
to facilitate mainstreaming the concept into Security Council action under chapter 
VII, based on principles from the original ICISS report from 2001 along with the 
Madrid report (see Kettemann 2011 for details). He argues that the coalition’s 
outspoken goal of regime-change in Libya instead should have been formulated in 
line with human security principles, motivated through the ”right intention” 
principle outlined in the now obsolete original ICISS report from 2001. 
 The reasons that five important international actors (Brazil, China, 
Germany, India and Russia) decided to abstain from voting on resolution 1973 
(2011) can also be derived to matters fundamental to human security. Among the 
reasons were claims to respect the internal political process (thus, non-
interventionism) and the unwillingness to risk a prolonged conflict with 
international interference, but also protection of civilians, as representatives from 
Brazil claimed that more interference in the conflict could cause ”more harm than 
good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting” (UNSC 2011). 
The German position also stressed the ”likelihood of large-scale loss of life”, and 
how the countries voting for and participating in the enforcement of a resolution 
in favor of intervention could be caught in an prolonged military conflict which 
risked to spread across a wider region (Kettemann 2011: 47-48). This shows how 
human security rhetoric also can be used to hinder humanitarian intervention.  
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3. Analyzing human security as policy: 
obstacles due to conceptual vagueness? 
In the previous chapter I elaborated on how the popularity of human security can 
be related to a changed security landscape, and how fluctuations in the appeal of 
human security is related to events taking place in this new security landscape. 
Examining human security from a policy point-of-view, there are obstacles to 
human security as a policy agenda that are frequently occurring in the debate 
surrounding the applicability of human security. The conceptualization of human 
security as ”freedom from want” has seen most criticism in this regard, due to its 
vague and ”all-encompassing” nature (see Floyd 2007; Kerr 2007; Paris 2001 & 
2004; Remacle 2008; Tadjbakhsh 2009). It is sometimes pointed to how the broad 
school of human security ”encompasses everything from substance abuse to 
genocide” (Kerr 2007: 95), and that this broad agenda makes human security lose 
its appeal to policymakers (McDonald 2002: 283). On the other hand, Kaldor’s 
view of human security has been criticized for being too focused on ”freedom 
from fear” at the expense of ”freedom from want”, leading to labels such as the 
”Kaldorian interventionist” approach (Kerkkänen 2014: 8). For example, Ryerson 
(2010) argues that approaches to human security stemming from ”freedom from 
fear” are adopted to meet the needs and ends of a Northern, masculinized liberal 
system, and is therefore structured in a way that is similar to the state-centric 
traditional view of security, focusing on physical violence. Also Richmond (2007) 
points to the ”top-down” aspect of the Kaldorian approach, as it is tied to strong 
states and internationally-driven institutions which are to provide the basic need 
of human security - protection from physical violence. However, Kaldor’s own 
definition acknowledges principles of a ”bottom-up” approach; ”Notions of 
’partnership’, ’local ownership’, and ’participation’ are already key concepts in 
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development policy. These concepts should also apply to security 
policies” (Kaldor 2012: 8). Still, Kaldor’s focus on interventionism leads some 
scholars to categorize it as an institutional approach. 
 Picciotto, Olonisakin and Clarke stress that a new, common, definition 
should be broad enough to encompass a variety of concerns seen by several 
countries, but also narrow enough to be useful as an analytical framework 
(Picciotto et al. 2007: 35). Evidently, translating human security into policy is 
painstaking considering the friction within human security. In an effort to 
categorize and elucidate these diffusing aspects, I will take a closer look at human 
security policy as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want”. 
3.1. Key signifiers in discourses influencing human 
security as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from 
want” 
I will now introduce some of the key discourses, nodal points and moments that 
have been prominent in the ongoing debate concerning human security since its 
inception. Seen in the context built up by the previous chapters of this thesis, the 
following chapter will mainly elucidate the conceptual debate on human security 
from a policy standpoint, and showcase how policy texts can be understood as an 
arena of struggle ”between contenders of competing objectives, where language - 
or more specifically discourse - is used tactically” (Fulcher 1989: 7). The sources 
for this part consists of documents referring to human security policy as ”freedom 
from fear” or ”freedom from want”; policy documents on human security, 
speeches on policy directions in human security as well as secondary documents 
referring to human security policy. Regarding policy based in an understanding of 
human security as ”freedom from want” I will mainly analyze material from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Policy based on human security as 
”freedom from fear” will be analyzed through examination of policy documents 
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originating mainly from the Canadian government, but also sources from the 
Norwegian political life are of interest here, due to its advocacy of human security 
as ”freedom from fear”. I will also examine secondary sources comparing 
”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want”. Although space and time 
limitation prevent a full intertextual analysis, I will seek to trace key signifiers 
through the chains of texts, highlighting the chains of signification constituted by 
discoursal nodal points seen in the two differing conceptualizations of human 
security policy.  
 To elucidate the differences between ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom 
from want” as clearly as possible, I will utilize my analytical framework drawing 
on discourse theory and CDA to identify contested signifiers, and show how they 
are ”up for grabs” by both discourses. For example, the sign ”vulnerability” - a 
polysemic element which exists in both conceptualizations - has been situated 
antagonistically between the different approaches. I will make visible how both 
advocators of ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” have sought to 
transform it from a polysemic element into a moment in accordance with their 
particular understanding of human security, through articulatory hegemonization.  
3.2. ”Freedom from want” policy 
Discussing human security at the International Conference on Human Security in 
a Globalized World in Ulan Bator on May 8 2000, the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
acknowledged that: ”[t]here are two basic aspects to human security - freedom 
from fear and freedom from want [and while] some countries seem to focus solely 
on the first aspect [in] Japan's view, however, human security is a much broader 
concept. We believe that freedom from want is no less critical than freedom from 
fear. So long as its objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals 
as human beings, it is necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in 
terms of protecting human life in conflict situations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan 2000). 
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 In 2007, Yukio Takasu, Ambassador of Japan in charge of Human 
Security, talked at the Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network. 
Takasu commented on the increasing support of human security, both within the 
UN and regionally. Describing the essence of human security as being dependent 
on the interconnected pillars of peace (”free from conflict”), development (”free 
from poverty and diseases”), and human rights (”free from violence and 
discrimination”), Takasu once again stressed the holistic nature of the Japanese 
understanding of human security. This was further clarified as he acknowledged 
that; ”[b]eing a broad concept, and major concern and insecurity vary from one 
to another, each human security initiative must have a clear order of priority 
[and] the most serious insecurity has to be identified for each case for action, 
reflecting capacity to realize change […] In my view, post-conflict peace building 
is one such area. Human trafficking is another area. Achievement of MDGs is 
also another important challenge. Japan will develop concrete actions in these 
areas” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007). 
 At the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security on May 22 
2008 Ambassador Takasu stated how human security was to be distinguished from 
the responsibility to protect, elaborating on how: ”[i]t is consistent with the letter 
and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and promoted in full respect of 
national sovereignty. Human security is complimentary to state security [and] it 
embraces a culture of empowerment and prevention to avoid the outbreak of 
humanitarian crisis” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008). Here, human 
security is seen to be understood as fully committed to respect national 
sovereignty, and as to foster preventive policies based on empowerment in order 
to meet humanitarian crises. Discussing the essence of human security, Takasu 
stated three key points; ”First, it is a human-centered approach in tackling global 
issues, putting the livelihood and dignity of individuals and communities at the 
center of our focus. Second, it requires us to take not a piecemeal approach but an 
integrated, holistic and multi-sectoral approach, comprising of physical security, 
development and human rights [responding to] a wide range of threats such as 
conflict and violence, poverty, underdevelopment, infectious disease, human rights 
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violations and natural disasters. Third, the strategy we should follow is to protect 
and empower individuals and their communities. Protective strategies shield 
people from harm. Empowerment strategies help people to increase their 
resilience […] [H]uman security puts the emphasis on prevention through 
empowerment of individuals and communities” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan 2008). While mentioning aspects also found in the understanding of human 
security as ”freedom from fear” (”conflict” and ”violence”), Takasu emphasized 
the holistic nature of the concept, stressing the need to also acknowledge threats 
stemming from a human development discourse, such as ”poverty”, 
”underdevelopment”, ”infectious disease” and ”natural disasters”, and to meet 
those threats with  ”protective” and ”empowerment strategies”.  
 A similar view of human security is shared by Norwegian scholar Astri 
Suhrke. She stresses ”vulnerability” as a vital component of human security, 
defining three categories of victims; ”1. victims of war and internal conflict; 2. 
people living at or below subsistence levels; and 3. victims of natural 
disasters” (Suhrke 1999). While aspects of war and internal conflict are present in 
this definition, it can be understood as drawing on a conceptualization of human 
security as ”freedom from want”, as it blends the conflict aspect with threats 
constituted by matters closely tied to a human development discourse and 
underdevelopment, but also threats originating from natural disasters, which can 
give rise to hardships catapulting people in to underdevelopment. 
Intertextual chains identifying the nodal point and privileged signs of human 
security as ”freedom from want” 
Examining the intertextual chains of ”freedom from want”-policy, it is visibly 
influenced by a non-traditional understanding of security situated in a human 
development discourse, drawing on the work of Mahbub ul Haq. Human security 
from ”underdevelopment” is identified as the nodal point binding the discourse 
influencing ”freedom from want” together. Other privileged signs making up the 
chain of signification to this nodal point are ”poverty”, ”vulnerability”, (structural 
and direct) ”violence”, ”hunger”, ”disease”, ”sovereignty”, ”empowerment” and 
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”environmental issues”. Also (internal) ”conflict” is a sign which is frequently 
occurring in this discourse, often tied to the prefixes ”pre-” and ”post-”. With its 
focus on full respect for sovereignty, signs such as (humanitarian and military) 
”intervention”, ”responsibility to protect” and ”coercive (hard) force” can be 
found in the order of discourse of ”freedom from want”. 
3.3. ”Freedom from fear” policy 
In her study of  the conceptual underpinnings of human security policy, Acharya 
(2001) quotes the former Canadian minister of foreign affairs Lloyd Axworthy as 
acknowledging the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report for being 
responsible for coining the term ”human security”, but that it focused too much on 
threats originating from underdevelopment at the expense of ”human insecurity 
resulting from violent conflict” (Acharya 2001: 445). In 1999 the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stated in a report how: 
”[t]he concept of human security has increasingly centered on the cost of human 
conflict” (DFAIT 1999). In a speech  on the topic human security and Canadian 1
foreign policy, former Canadian member of parliament David Kilgour outlined the 
underpinnings of the Canadian human security initiative. Pointing to the changed 
nature of conflicts after the end of the Cold War, Kilgour reaffirmed Axworthy’s 
focus on human security as an integral part of Canada’s international agenda, and 
stated how ”armed conflict has taken on a different shape, often rooted in 
religious or ethnic discord. While the number of armed conflicts between states 
has declined over the last 25 years, the number of intra-state conflicts has 
increased dramatically” (Kilgour 1999).  
 The speech continued by stressing how ”[i]ndividuals are increasingly the 
principal victims, targets and instruments of modern war. […] [T]he state-
sponsored murders and disappearances perpetrated against thousands of innocent 
people […] underscores the fact that in our world, civilians suffer the most from 
 for the sake of transparency, the speech was presented by Senator Nick Taylor on Kilgour’s behalf.1
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violent conflict [and] bear the brunt of the new practices of war […] And they 
suffer most from the inexpensive yet all-too-readily-available weapons of modern 
war, such as landmines and military small arms and light weapons. As minister 
Axworthy said recently, civilian casualties and mass displacement are […] often 
explicit in the strategy of combatants” (Kilgour 1999).   
 While acknowledging the mutual benefits that can be reached by seeing 
state and human security as mutually supportive, Kilgour’s speech was firm on 
the topic of humanitarian intervention; ”In the face of massive state-sponsored 
murders […] the humanitarian imperative to act cannot be ignored and can 
outweigh concerns about state sovereignty” and continued to stress the potential 
need for hard power; ”[h]ard power -- even military force -- is sometimes needed 
to achieve human security goals. Pursuing human security involves using a 
variety of tools. Some rely more on persuasion -- as with the campaign to ban 
anti-personnel mines […] while others are more robust, such as sanctions or 
military intervention. Similarly, support for military force does not mean 
abandoning human security. In Kosovo, clearly the opposite is true. The decision 
to pursue the military option was made precisely to ensure the security of 
Kosovo's population. Our support for the UN mission currently being deployed to 
East Timor is based on the same logic” (Kilgour 1999).  
 Finally, Kilgour discusses ”vulnerability”, which also is a prominent sign 
in the understanding of human security as ”freedom from want”. However, 
Kilgour ties it in to a discourse of traditional, physical, threats to human security; 
”In the new global environment, it is the most vulnerable […] whose security is 
most at risk […] Nowhere is this more true than in situations of armed 
conflict” (Kilgour 1999). 
 Kilgour’s speech reaffirms the focus on physical violence as the main 
focal point of human security as ”freedom from fear”. It is the integral threat 
which is to be secured, as suggested solutions are transformed into human security 
policy. Policy to ban anti-personnel Landmines is one example (as ”freedom from 
fear” was highly influential in the adoption of the 1997 Ottawa convention), and 
the stance on humanitarian intervention shows that the Canadian conception of 
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human security is to be seen as an instrument in policy outlining peace operations. 
Current Canadian PM Stephen Harper initially proclaimed to keep Canada out of 
foreign interventions, and downplayed the human security agenda to instead focus 
on national security matters (Kelly 2011). However, in 2011 this strategy shifted 
as Harper committed Canada to join the intervention in Libya on humanitarian 
grounds, and began to accentuate values such as human rights as a cornerstone to 
Canada’s foreign policy. Thus, scholars argue that the human security agenda still 
remains largely intact in Canada’s foreign policy, albeit with less explicit 
reference to the term (see MacLean 2009). As such, human security as ”freedom 
from fear” is still actively promoted, especially as a tool in the humanitarian 
interventionist tool-box.  
 Sverre Lodgaard of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs shares 
the Canadian understanding of human security as ”freedom from fear”, stressing 
that human security should not be mixed with human development. Defining 
human security as ”freedom from fear of physical violence”, in the paper ”Human 
Security: Concept and Operationalization” (2007) Lodgaard states how the core of 
human security corresponds to the core of state security; ”both of them centre on 
material means – usually referred to as military force in the context of state 
security, physical violence in the case of human security” (Lodgaard 2007). 
Lodgaard elaborates on the interlinkages between state- and human security, but 
stresses that oppressive regimes may undermine the security of its own people. He 
points to the importance of international law, and of the United Nations to have 
effective mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, since ”the state is no longer 
able to monopolize the concept and practice of security” (Lodgaard 2007). Still, 
Lodgaard rejects a broadening of human security to include non-traditional threats 
stemming from underdevelopment and environmental degradation, since 
”proposals to incorporate such challenges into the general, universal usage of 
security are misguided: first, because the concept tends to become all-inclusive 
and therefore empty of contents, and second, because the issues and their 
solutions do not necessarily benefit from being securitized”, stating how the field 
of human security ”has become overcrowded” (Lodgaard 2007). Also Kaldor 
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touches on the debate between ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” 
outlining policy suggestions for human security, but ultimately points to the need 
for effective and ”robust interventionist policy […] to prevent a repeat of future 
Srebrenicas or Rwandas” (Kaldor 2012: 7), hence echoing an understanding of 
human security similar to ”freedom from fear”. 
Intertextual chains identifying the nodal point and privileged signs of human 
security as ”freedom from fear” 
Examining the intertextual chains of ”freedom from fear”-policy, it is influenced 
by an understanding of security similar to traditional security discourse, with the 
vital distinction that the referent object of security is the individual instead of the 
state. This view has been referred to as ”security with a human face” (Neufeld 
2004), implying the humanitarian influence on a more traditional security 
discourse; thus, this can be dubbed a ”humanitarian security discourse”. Human 
security from ”physical violence” is identified as the nodal point binding the 
discourse influencing human security as ”freedom from fear” together (e.g. 
”freedom from fear of physical violence constitutes the core of human security”). 
Other privileged signs making up the chain of signification to this nodal point are 
”vulnerability” (to physical violence), (internal and military) ”conflict”, (coercive 
use of) ”hard force”, ”military force”, (humanitarian and military) ”intervention” 
and ”peacekeeping”. In the order of discourse we find signs connected to a 
discourse of ”human development”, such as ”poverty”, ”hunger”, ”disease” and 
”environmental issues”. 
3.4. Contested signification and discursive 
hegemonization: hybridity in human security policy 
texts 
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Several scholars stress the need for conceptual clarity in order for human security 
to have political impact. Lodgaard points to how it risks being discredited because 
it is used in a broad and varying way, and that; ”[t]his is not a problem that 
scholars can resolve on their own. Uniform usage and political clout can only be 
achieved if there is broad international agreement among political and public 
leaders to promote it with one voice” (Lodgaard 2007). I will now exemplify the 
discursive struggle for human security, as different understandings seek to 
hegemonize the concept. Lodgaard stresses that it is important to apply a narrow 
understanding of human security for the sake of conceptual clarity, and warns to 
include aspects stemming from a development discourse - such as structural 
violence or environmental issues - into the concept;  
 ”Many agree that freedom from fear of physical violence constitutes the 
core of human security. Fewer agree that the concept should be limited to that. 
For instance, there are those who emphasize that for most people of the world, 
hunger, disease and environmental contamination represent graver security 
concerns than physical violence. They hold that the concept should include 
freedom from structural as well as direct violence. Astrid Suhrke has suggested 
that ’vulnerability' could be the defining characteristic, homing in on three 
categories of extremely vulnerable people: victims of war and internal conflict; 
those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at 
the edge of socio-economic disaster; and victims of natural disaster” (Lodgaard 
2007). In the following section Lodgaard performs a hegemonic intervention in 
this debate, as he challenges Suhrke’s ”vulnerability” approach to human security 
by making articulations that ties ”vulnerability” to a narrow understanding of 
human security; ”In support of this approach, it is claimed that the condition of 
abject poverty or powerlessness is not qualitatively different from vulnerability to 
physical violence during conflict. Defined this way, humanitarian assistance and 
emergency aid become matters of security policy. Per consequence, the distinction 
between human security and human development becomes somewhat unclear, just 
as the distinction between humanitarian aid and development aid may be hard to 
define in accurate terms. […] Humanitarian aid usually benefits from being 
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depoliticized, cutting clear of political objectives and security concerns. Most of it 
flows under the banner of impartiality and neutrality, for good reason: it would be 
counterproductive to lump it into the realm of security policy. Moreover, to be at 
the edge of socio-economic disaster may or may not lead to violent actions. 
Obviously, to clarify the conditions under which they do or don’t is a matter of 
importance in order to avoid physical violence. But to be analytically equipped to 
do so, human security should not be mixed with the precarious human conditions 
that may threaten it. Threats must remain external to the concept. Once again, the 
limited definition seems preferable” (Lodgaard 2007).  
 By challenging Suhrke’s vulnerability approach Lodgaard seeks to 
reformulate the element ”vulnerability” into a moment corresponding to human 
security as ”freedom from fear”, and thus designate the signs of human security 
tied to a human development discourse into the order of discourse. Lodgaard 
contrasts security for ”vulnerable” people with signifiers such as ”poverty”. 
Further, by stressing the need for human security to also retain its analytical 
applicability, Lodgaard argues that threats stemming from an unpredictable 
(”precarious conditions” that ”may” pose a threat) source of underdevelopment 
therefore are too broad and speculative to be included into the concept. Thus, 
while ”vulnerability” has a place in Lodgaard’s narrow understanding of human 
security, it is tied to a discourse drawing on traditional security threats. It is 
connected to the nodal point ”physical violence”, hence surpassing signs 
connected to a ”human development” discourse to human security’s order of 
discourse, since Lodgaard made a hegemonic intervention when he dismissed 
Suhrke’s use of the sign ”vulnerability” together with signs originating from a 
development discourse. Thus, Lodgaard’s statement that it ”would be 
counterproductive to lump it into the realm of security policy” designates signs 
situated in a human development discourse (such as ”poverty”, ”hunger”, 
”disease”, ”structural violence” and ”environmental contamination”) to the order 
of discourse of the narrow understanding of human security. It reformulates the 
sign ”vulnerability” into a moment connected to ”freedom from fears” nodal point 
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”physical violence” through a hegemonic intervention, and ultimately seeks to 
hegemonize a narrow perception of human security. 
3.5. Prospects for a unified approach of human 
security? 
As suggested by Acharya (2001: 443-444), while the different interpretations of 
human security might not necessarily be incompatible, they do spur controversy. 
A general difference is that ”freedom from fear” relates human security to direct 
violence, as ”freedom from want” mainly focuses on structural violence, thus, in a 
bigger debate the floating signifier ”human security” is the focus of a discursive 
struggle. Regarding social space for the differing opinions on human security, 
Tadjbakhsh (2009: 7) see a ”North-South”-divide in the discursive struggle on 
human security, as countries in the west (such as Canada and European countries) 
are adopting the ”freedom from fear” agenda, while Japan and developing 
countries are advocating the ”freedom from want” approach. Acharya points to a 
divide in conception of human security between East and West, but that 
disagreements also can be seen as ”West-West”, or ”East-East” (Acharya 2001: 
445-447). Antagonistic understandings of human security within the same social 
space was seen in how Lodgaard questions Suhrke’s ”vulnerability”-aspect of 
human security.  
 This chapter has shown that even though the two policy agendas overlap 
on several issues (protection from physical violence, most notably), the means to 
meet such challenges differ to a considerable extent. For human security to be 
valuable, both as an analytical concept as well as policy, it is important that it is 
used uniformly and with ”one voice”, as stated by Lodgaard. However, human 
security is currently a concept advocated mainly by ”middle-powers”. Muggah 
and Krause (2006: 114) have documented the American, Chinese, Russian, Iranian 
and Egyptian (among others) unease towards human security, as it is believed to 
encroach on their sovereignty and freedom of action, thus limiting the declaratory 
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use of the concept. Still, the human security approach remains relevant due to a 
changed security landscape which demands new solutions to ensure security 
across and within borders, the interest in the concept within policy circles, and the 
outspoken goal of the UN to mainstream human security within several UN 
bodies (Krause 2007; UN News Centre 2010). However, while widespread use of 
a label or slogan in itself not necessarily have to equate relevance, the hesitation 
by major political players of a concept does not necessitate irrelevance. Instead, as 
Ruggie (1998) pointed to in a different context, the importance is the combination 
of ”social purpose” (in this case human security) and institutional power. It is 
therefore relevant here to examine to what extent human security has been 
mainstreamed into policymaking at the multilateral level. 
 Thus, I will now turn to an analysis of the current understanding of human 
security within the UN. The nodal points and the chains of signification identified 
in the previous chapter constitute the foundation for the discourse analysis of the 
2013 Human Security report. The previous identification of discourses influencing 
human security as ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” will provide 
nuances to the text and the claims made in the report, that could not be truly 
understood without knowledge of the contexts from which they arrived - their 
”intertextual roots” (Rear & Jones 2014: 20). It is important to be able to interpret 
such nuances, since the aim of the Human Security report is to hegemonize 
human security, by discursively appropriate signifiers in a way that lead to the 
fixation of meaning, and thus the consensual understanding of human security.  
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4. Analyzing human security within the 
United Nations  
In the beginning of this paper it was stated that in order to understand the origins 
and development of policies we need to ”identify the discourses that dominate in 
them, how they come to do so, and which discourses are excluded and 
marginalized in the process” (Paul 2009: 243). So far I have examined the 
development of human security, and while it is believed that alternative 
conceptions of security are needed in the new security landscape, it is clear that 
the concept has seen much debate and contestation due to conceptual unclarity. 
This is also the case within the UN. Efforts of ”human security 
mainstreaming” (UN News Centre 2010) have been promoted through various 
bodies, but the vagueness of the concept is often brought up as a factor slowing 
the concepts momentum. When a ”goal” for security was left out of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), several scholars described this as a 
blatant overlook (see Hill et al. 2010), and some called for an adoption of what 
could be called ”Millennium Security Goals” (Picciotto 2006), based on a human 
security agenda. 
4.1. Towards a common understanding of human 
security 
In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan compiled the report In Larger Freedom, emphasizing the need to realize 
three “freedoms”; the “freedom from want” and the “freedom from 
fear” (corresponding to human security), as well as the “freedom to live in 
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dignity”. The report further argued that today’s threats demanded “broad, deep 
and sustained global cooperation. Thus the nations of the world must create a 
collective security system to prevent terrorism, strengthen non-proliferation, and 
bring peace to war-torn areas, while also promoting human rights, democracy and 
development” (UN Larger Freedom 2005; Global Policy Forum). A big step 
towards conceptual clarification was taken during the Summit, as the General 
Assembly decided to further a process to define the notion of human security, 
stressing ”the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and 
despair” pointing to how ”all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are 
entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity 
to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their potential” (UN General Assembly 
resolution 60/1, paragraph 143). After these rather broad acknowledgements, the 
Heads of State and Government made a commitment to continue to discuss and 
define human security in the General Assembly. Since then, a major source of 
discussion within the Human Security reports have been the contested nature of 
the concept, with calls for coherence and consensual understanding of human 
security and its implementation. In September 2012 resolution 66/290 was 
adopted, in which the Assembly agreed on a common understanding of human 
security. I will now present the analysis of the 2013 Human Security report. In 
these reports the Secretary General outlines the progress of the human security 
agenda and points to challenges ahead, by summarizing previously adopted 
resolutions and how these resolutions have gained further ground in the effort to 
reach consensus on human security. Being the most recent report, the 2013 report 
echoes the statements of resolution 66/290, and its understanding of human 
security. 
Analytical tools  
I will analyze the 2013 Human Security report against the background of the 
conceptual debate about human security scrutinized in the previous stages of this 
paper. The analytical framework discussed in chapters 1.4.2-1.4.3 will be used to 
answer the question of which conceptualization of human security that enjoys 
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hegemony within the UN. The analysis will especially focus on the discourse 
theoretical concepts ”antagonism” and ”hegemony”, as well as the critical 
discourse analytical concepts ”intertextuality”, ”interdiscursivity” and ”order of 
discourse” as analytical tools. The understanding of human security presented in 
the 2013 Human Security report will be intertextually compared to the previously 
identified discourses and nodal points within human security as ”freedom from 
fear” and ”freedom from want”. The reports struggle to fix meaning ”in terms of 
one discourse rather than another” (Jörgensen & Phillips 2002: 165-166) will give 
the discourse theoretical concept of ”hegemony” particular interest in this 
analysis, since I will examine if the Secretary-General performs a hegemonic 
intervention against either ”freedom from fear” or ”freedom from want” when 
presenting the consensual understanding of human security. 
4.1.1. Analysis of the 2013 Human Security Report: consensus on 
human security within the United Nations 
The common understanding of human security, agreed on by the General 
Assembly, is considered a major breakthrough for the conceptual debate on 
human security. The 2013 Human Security report states how the definition and 
common understanding of human security ”draws on 7 years of discussion on 
human security at the General Assembly and builds on nearly 20 years of 
experience of implementing the human security approach within the United 
Nations system and beyond” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3). The report is based 
on information gathered through questionnaires and discussions on human 
security at the General Assembly, and draws on experiences from various human 
security projects. Thus, the diffusion surrounding the status of human security 
over the last decades can be understood according to the discourse theoretical 
position pointed to by Laclau and Mouffe that the subject position (in this case the 
referent object for human security) is fragmented and overdetermined, and has 
finally been given an identity within the UN, although this identity might be 
contingent outside of the UN.  
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 Under the heading ”A common understanding of human security”, and 
paragraphs 4 a-h, several statements are made which define the newfound 
understanding of human security. An analysis of the statements shows how the 
report from the Secretary General hegemonizes human security: 
4 (a) ”[…] the Assembly agreed on a common understanding of human security 
which included the following: (a) The right of people to live in freedom and 
dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable 
people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want” (UN Secretary-
General 2013: 2). 
4 (b) ”Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context specific 
and prevention oriented responses that strengthen the protection and 
empowerment of all people and all communities” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 
3). 
In paragraph 4 (b), the common understanding of human security is said to foster 
policy responses based on a ”comprehensive”, ”context specific” and ”prevention 
oriented” understanding of human security. Examining these statements 
intertextually and interdiscursively to the previous chapters’ presentation of the 
discursive struggle for human security, we find that they are mainly in line with 
the discourse influencing human security as ”freedom from want”. The statements 
echo the definition offered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which 
mainly draws on a similar understanding of human security as the human 
development agenda. As we saw in the earlier chapters outlining the different 
discourses influencing human security, signs such as ”prevention oriented” and 
”comprehensive” are closely tied to the nodal point human security from 
”underdevelopment”, treating human security as ”freedom from want”. 
 Turning to the statements under paragraph 4 (a), the agreed upon 
definition of human security stresses the need for ”vulnerable” people to 
enjoy”freedom from fear and freedom from want”. Here, the Secretary General 
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stresses ”vulnerability” as an especially important condition in need of attention 
from human security. Intertextually, ”vulnerability” can be found both in the 
narrow and the broad conceptualization of human security, and can thus be 
understood both within a more traditional (albeit humanitarian) security discourse, 
as well as in a human development discourse. The statement ”[a]ll individuals, in 
particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from 
want”, thus need some elaboration. By relating back to the earlier discussion 
throughout this paper it seems as if the report of the Secretary General strives to 
merge the two schools of human security. However, remembering the qualitative 
text analytical premise of the need to be aware of different interpretations of the 
same word in different contexts (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 224), the use of the labels 
”freedom from fear” and ”freedom from want” in this context rather refers to the 
pillars of which the UN was founded, as the expressions are found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as I discussed in chapter 2. This becomes 
clear as the report further states how; 
4 (d) ”The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect 
and its implementation” and, under section 4 (e), ”human security does not entail 
the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State 
security”  (UN Secretary-General 2013: 3). 
Here, two major statements are made about the understanding of human security. 
First, by claiming that human security is to be contrasted to the responsibility to 
protect, the Secretary General essentially rules out the implementation of human 
security in peace operations, including interventions such as the one in Libya in 
2011. Second, the statement that human security does not entail the use of force or 
coercive measures further clarifies the newly reached agreement on what human 
security should mean. It seems that the conceptualization of human security as 
”freedom from fear” discussed earlier in this paper, is now to be replaced with 
responsibility to protect. The meaning of human security presented here is 
distinctly excluding signs connected to the nodal point ”physical violence” of 
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”freedom from fear” - the aspect of hard force, and active protection against direct 
violence found in the understanding of human security as ”freedom from fear”. 
Thus, the UN definition rejects the understanding of human security within a 
humanitarian discourse based on a definition of security in more traditional terms, 
and thus as similar to the R2P-agenda. Here, the report also performs a hegemonic 
intervention in the use of the sign ”vulnerable” (mentioned in paragraph 4 (a)), as 
it is now to be understood that efforts to ensure human security for vulnerable 
people are incompatible with the ”use of force” and actions that are connected to 
humanitarian intervention. It can thus be seen as if the report, by drawing on a 
human development discourse influencing human security as ”freedom from 
want”, is hegemonizing the contested signifier ”vulnerability” by excluding it 
from a discourse advocating a narrow understanding of human security, and 
instead aligns it with an understanding of human security as ”freedom from 
want”.   
 This argument is further strengthened when the report goes on to 
conceptualize human security as being based on national ownership and non-
interference in state matters; 
4 (g) ”Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the 
survival, livelihood and dignity for their citizens. The role of the international 
community is to complement and provide necessary support to Governments, upon 
their request, so to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging 
threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among 
Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society” (UN 
Secretary-General 2013: 3). 
4 (h) ”Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect 
for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters 
that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security 
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does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States” (UN Secretary-
General 2013: 3). 
             
These two statements can be intertextually traced to Japan’s human security 
policy as ”freedom from want”. For example, at the General Assembly Thematic 
Debate on Human Security on May 22 in 2008, Ambassador Yukio Takasu stated 
how human security was to be distinguished from the responsibility to protect, 
since it: ”is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and promoted in full respect of national sovereignty” and how the 
international community should work together with governments to foster 
preventive policies built on human security to respond to emerging threats; 
”Human security is complimentary to state security. [It should] provide the 
environment under which individuals can develop fully their potential to enjoy a 
healthy and happy life, and communities become more resilient against sudden 
downfall. And it embraces a culture of empowerment and prevention” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008). 
 Considering the apparent focus within the UN to disconnect human 
security from the humanitarian interventionist agenda, an observation can be 
made about how the report refers to the ongoing conflict in Syria. However, while 
the ongoing internal conflict in Syria was highly profiled by the time of the 
release of the report (December 23rd 2013), the Syrian civil war is not mentioned. 
This, in turn, leads us to examine how human security is situated in relation to the 
post-conflict situation in Libya, to see if human security policy is seen as 
applicable in this case. The report states the following, stressing how human 
security initiatives are seen as an empowering tool for vulnerable groups, again 
highlighting the link between human security and human development;  
”In Libya, the United Nations country team identified the human security 
approach as the most appropriate strategic framework for addressing competing 
national priorities. The strategic framework 2013-2014 highlights the importance 
of empowering conflict-affected communities to participate in the country’s 
!  56
transition while building on the capacity of the Transitional Government to meet 
the various challenges and provide the necessary protection and empowerment for 
vulnerable groups” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 6). 
While environmental issues are not explicitly stated in the common understanding 
of human security, it is acknowledged as an area encompassed by human security, 
further strengthening its connection to the nodal point human security as 
”underdevelopment”;  
”In the Pacific region, where climate change continues to threaten sustainable 
economic development, the Pacific Islands Forum adopted the Human Security 
Framework [which improves] the understanding and implementation of the 
human security approach in the region and outlines a framework for the 
integration of peace, security, development and environmental initiatives in the 
Pacific context” (UN Secretary-General 2013: 8). 
4.1.2. Hegemonizing human security: reaching closure on human 
security within the United Nations 
Analyzing the statements taken from the 2013 Human Security report using the 
analytical framework outlined in chapters 1.4.2-1.4.3, the analysis shows how the 
report from the Secretary General is reaching closure on some key elements for 
the ongoing discursive struggle over the floating signifier human security. While it 
draws on a broad definition of human security, it cannot, however, be said that this 
definition represents an ”anything goes” agenda. Instead, by analyzing what the 
report assigns to the order of discourse (i.e. what is left out of the discourse) of 
human security, it becomes clear that these are signs that also can be found in the 
order of discourse of the Japanese understanding of human security as ”freedom 
from want”. For example, the statement that human security does not entail the 
use of force, and is distinct from responsibility to protect, alludes to how the 
military aspects of the Canadian conception of human security as ”freedom from 
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fear” are no longer seen as compatible with the human security concept. Thus, the 
floating signifier human security is being tied to values similar to the conception 
of human security as ”freedom from want”, drawing on a human development 
discourse and a broader comprehension of human security. Thus, the signs found 
in the order of discourse for the UN conception of human security, are signs 
which constitute human security as ”freedom from fear”. 
 Moreover, the understanding of human security described under section 4 
(h) as a matter for the state and a concept strictly obedient to national sovereignty 
of states also shifts the focus and interpretation of human security from the 
original ”freedom from fear”-agenda, by articulating human security around signs 
such as ”sovereignty”, ”territorial integrity” and ”non-interference”. Therefore, a 
conclusion that can be drawn in regards to the discursive struggle for human 
security, is that the humanitarian discourse of human security as ”freedom from 
fear” is being challenged. It is being restructured, and its moments are being 
reformulated through articulations and tied to other signs which are more in line 
with the intertextual chains of a ”freedom from want” conceptualization of human 
security. By ruling out the use of force or coercive measures, within this discourse 
human security is being tied to a chain of equivalence of values such as 
”sovereignty”, ”non-interference” and ”non-coercive”. It thus becomes evident 
how the consensual understanding of human security within the UN stands in 
antagonistic relationship to the notion and application of humanitarian 
intervention. While important aspects of human security as ”freedom from fear” is 
pointed to in the report (joint international cooperation on small arms and light 
weapons are given as an example of the work of the Human Security Network), 
the overall message from the report is that the consensual understanding of human 
security is considered a holistic, context specific approach, situated in a human 
development discourse. 
 Examining the statements how human security is to be understood as the 
”right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair”, 
and the safeguarding of ”[a]ll individuals, in particular vulnerable people”, we 
find a definition that draws on a human development discourse, similar to how 
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Suhrke’s sees ”vulnerability” as a defining characteristic of human security. A 
chain of equivalence can thus be found, where vulnerability is constituting a key 
signifier by drawing on a human security discourse connected to the nodal point 
human security from ”underdevelopment”, with signs such as ”poverty” and 
”despair”. Thus, while ”vulnerability” is also a privileged sign within the 
humanitarian discourse influencing ”freedom from fear”, the 2013 Human 
Security report is performing a hegemonic intervention concerning the sign 
”vulnerability”. It is performed in an opposite fashion compared to the hegemonic 
intervention Lodgaard performed against Suhrke on this particular sign in chapter 
3.4. Lodgaard tied ”vulnerability” to a narrow understanding and the nodal point 
human security from ”physical violence”, by disconnecting it from signs related 
to a human development discourse, in an attempt to hegemonize human security. 
Thus, the hegemonization of human security within the UN ties the concept to 
”freedom from want’s” nodal point - human security from ”underdevelopment” - 
and signs such as ”poverty”, ”hunger”, ”disease” and ”environmental issues”. 
4.2. Interpreting the analysis: implications of the UN 
consensus on human security for the discursive 
struggle between ”freedom from fear” and ”freedom 
from want” 
A careful reading of the UNSG’s 2013 Human Security report reveals several 
implications for the discursive struggle between the two main conceptualizations 
of human security. A major conclusion that can be made concerning the definition 
of human security within the UN is how this definition contrasts human security 
from responsibility to protect ”and its implementation”. Going back to earlier 
chapters of this paper, this means that human security no longer contains several 
aspects seen in the narrow ”freedom from fear”-perspective, and is no longer 
envisioned in cases of humanitarian intervention. Thinking about the 
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consequences this use of human security might bring, we can return to chapter 3 
to see some potential outcomes of mainstreaming human security in the UN 
within policy closely tied to a development agenda. There is a reason for treating 
humanitarian aid as depoliticized and neutral, thus decoupling it from political or 
security objectives (most of it ”flows under the banner of impartiality and 
neutrality for good reason”, as Lodgaard puts it). It remains to be seen how future 
human security operations are treated, considering previous arguments from the 
G77 about human security as a ”Trojan Horse”.  
 However, this argument could be understood as one of the main reasons to 
why human security is being delinked from the principle of R2P; to prevent 
coalitions to intervene in foreign affairs of other nations under the banner of 
human security. While the support for humanitarianism was strong in the light of 
Rwanda and Srebrenica, after the intervention in Iraq in 2003 the view that the 
”sun has set” on the humanitarian interventionist agenda gained stronger support. 
The reasons for the intervention were put into question, which also affected the 
concept of R2P. The credibility of Western coalitions as norm-carriers has 
weakened in the 21st century, mainly following the ”war on terror”, but also since 
the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Similar controversy surrounded the 2011 
intervention in Libya, which is believed to have hampered the possibilities for 
humanitarian intervention in Syria. Thus, referring back to the discussion about 
the discursive struggle within the humanitarian security paradigm, and the 
humanitarian turn coming to an end after the events on 9/11, the analysis of the 
Human Security report shows how the concept of human security is even more 
tied to values in line with the ”freedom from want”-approach. Hence, the 
statement that human security is to be distinct from responsibility to protect, and 
that the use of force is not envisioned in relation to human security, will, if upheld, 
stop the questions about immoral and arbitrary use of human security. 
 The decoupling of human security from coercive use could also be 
explained by the importance of the concept within the UN, and the outspoken goal 
to mainstream human security within several UN bodies. This task is easier to 
achieve on a broader scale if coercive measures encroaching on state sovereignty 
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are taken out of the principle of human security. On the other hand, this rules out 
human security mainstreaming on the level which many regard as the most 
important - the level of ongoing conflict (see e.g. Kettemann 2011). Thus, the 
”conflict gap” pointed to by Kettemann, which R2P failed to fill in the case of 
Libya, will still exist in future peace operations. As we saw, no mention of the 
conflict in Syria is to be found in the report. Applying the text analytical principle 
of latent meanings in texts, the absence of a reference to the conflict in Syria can 
be interpreted as rendering human security irrelevant for ongoing conflicts, further 
strengthening Kettemann’s point about the conflict gap, and the missed 
opportunity for human security mainstreaming in the 2011 conflict in Libya. It 
also remains firm to the definition of human security presented in the 2013 
Human Security report, as a tool suited in the pre- and post-stages of a conflict, 
but not during the actual conflict itself. 
 It could be argued that the human security paradigm no longer is a tool in 
the tool-box of humanitarian intervention, that R2P has ”branched out” from 
human security, and taken its place. In this sense, at least within the UN, ”freedom 
from fear” as previously understood, needs to be reevaluated. It is important to 
note that this is true within the UN, since a given definition of human security is 
contingent (possible but not necessary), and can therefore take a different shape 
outside of UN applicability of human security policy. As became evident in the 
intertextual analysis of human security policy as ”freedom from fear”, the 
Canadian human security policy agenda has been closely tied to, and instrumental 
for, the humanitarian intervention agenda. While the newfound consensus on 
human security within the UN will not end the ”paradigm” of humanitarian 
intervention (since the principle of R2P is still advocated), distancing human 
security from R2P does have implications for both concepts, especially since 
human security was such an instrumental concept in the creation of the ICISS 
report and R2P. The discourse on human security presented in the 2013 Human 
Security report is performing a hegemonic intervention, as several signs 
connected to the discourse influencing human security as ”freedom from fear” is 
now to be surpassed to the order of discourse of the UN definition of human 
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security; signs such as ”coercive force” and ”humanitarian intervention”. Still, the 
report reaffirms the work of the Human Security Network, which includes aspects 
of the ”freedom from fear” agenda, such as the work against proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons. Even so, a fundamental principle of ”freedom from fear” 
is the safeguarding of individuals in their most vulnerable state, and therefore the 
delinking of R2P from human security is noteworthy indeed, and sends a signal 
concerning what the concept of human security should entail.  
 The focus on ”empowerment" can be traced to human security as 
”freedom from want”. Human security policy should, therefore, be based on 
empowering the civil society, and individuals therein in need of human security 
leading to empowerment from a bottom-up perspective. The report points to 
several examples of how human security can help empower communities in the 
aftermath of conflict, strengthening local ownership and public participation 
through community-based self-help groups. Such strategies are underway in 
Timor-Leste, Burundi, Liberia and Uganda. This aspect brings up another 
reflection; as individuals in conflict situations are among the most vulnerable, and 
thus in desperate need of human security and freedom from fear, there is a need 
for these individuals to control their circumstances and to become part of a civil 
society which can bring about social change. This control is, needless to say, hard 
to come by in the midst of ongoing civil war, and the prospects for people 
suffering from violence first hand to constitute equal partners in an empowerment 
process stemming from government policy are unlikely. This points to the 
difficulty of designing inclusive human security policy during high-intensity 
conflict, and could constitute another reason for the distinction between human 
security and R2P within the UN.  
 A final thought stemming from critical security theory elucidates 
something of a paradox; by multilaterally advocating policy to strengthen states 
where human (in)security is an issue could potentially become counterproductive, 
as the state can be diagnosed as a source of human insecurity, as seen in earlier 
chapters of this paper. While the obvious goal is to foster strong legitimate states 
which can provide security for its citizens, involuntary effects of human security 
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policy must however be regarded as a possibility. Therefore, while critics could 
call for the execution of the ”Trojan Horse”, there is no guarantee that human 
security is stripped of all its side effects by decoupling it from the agenda of 
humanitarian intervention. 
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5. Concluding reflections 
As stated in the beginning of this paper, policy texts can be understood as ”an 
arena of struggle over meaning” (Taylor 2004: 435), and that the outcome of 
policies and their directions is the result of struggles ”between contenders of 
competing objectives, where language - or more specifically discourse - is used 
tactically” (Fulcher 1989: 7). In Wodak’s (2000) terms, the outlining of a 
consensual definition of human security presented in the 2013 Human Security 
report can be understood as evaluating different aspects of human security policy 
and move ”from conflict to consensus”, by settling on a common definition of 
what human security should entail. This process has been analyzed by performing 
a discourse analysis which revealed both the discursive struggle for, as well as the 
intertextual roots of, the consensual definition of human security within the UN. 
After years of debate, dating back to 1994, the UN Assembly agreed on a 
definition of human security by adopting resolution 66/290. This finally brings 
more clarity to the discursive struggle for human security seen over the last two 
decades, and is considered a major breakthrough for the concept and its ability to 
be translated into policy.  
 The analysis has situated the current understanding of human security in 
the UN firmly within a human development discourse, to some extent at the 
expense of a more traditional, humanitarian, security discourse. It highlighted how 
the report hegemonizes the concept, and reaches closure on the discursive struggle 
for human security within the UN by reproducing a broader understanding of 
human security as ”freedom from want” over a narrower understanding as 
”freedom from fear”. I elaborated on potential reasons for this outcome by 
relating back to the discussion about diminishing support for a humanitarian 
interventionist agenda. Human security rhetoric was used by some of the states 
who abstained from voting on resolution 1973 (2011) for intervention in Libya, 
thus showcasing fears that humanitarian intervention can further increase human 
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insecurity. However, while respect for national sovereignty is crucial for 
mobilizing broad support for human security within the General Assembly, this 
paper also acknowledges that the strengthening of states could have unintended 
side-effects, since states also can constitute a main source for human insecurity. 
This was seen during the Arab Spring, and is currently seen in the conflict in 
Syria.  
 Considering that the 2013 Human Security report does not mention the 
ongoing conflict in Syria, future research could very well further examine the 
applicability of human security in post-conflict situations. Since several scholars 
points to how human security mainstreaming failed in Libya and how it is 
currently ”failing” in Syria (see Kettemann 2011; Kerkkänen 2014), human 
security has gone from being a potentially ”hard” policy alternative to prevent a 
new Rwanda to even more take the shape of a tool in the human development 
tool-box, focusing on policy in pre- and post-conflict situations. While the 
missing ”human security goals" has been described as a blatant overlook in the 
original MDGs, it seems like human security will play a bigger role in the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda. In 2013 UNDP administrator Helen Clark 
stressed the value of human security, as it could lead to deeper analysis of the root 
causes and consequences of insecurities that threatens people’s lives (UNDP 
2013). Thus, going forward, human security seem to have found a more profound 
role in development policy. This belief is in line with this paper’s conclusions 
about the current state of human security, seeing how it is increasingly situated in 
a human development discourse, and decoupled from the more traditional 
humanitarian security discourse within the UN. Whatever the place for human 
security might be in the future, it is clear that the new security landscape demand 
a broadening of the security agenda, as several threats cannot be met and 
understood with traditional means of security.  
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Appendix 2: ICISS principles of ”Responsibility to 
Protect” (2001) 
The Responsibility to Protect: Principles for Military Intervention 
(1) The Just Cause Threshold 
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary 
measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to 
human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is 
the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed 
state situation; or 
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, 
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. 
(2) The Precautionary Principles 
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives 
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is 
better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and 
the victims concerned. 
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military 
option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with 
reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded. 
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military 
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection 
objective. 
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or 
averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of 
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction. 
(3) Right Authority 
A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security 
Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is 
not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the 
Security Council work better than it has. 
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B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military 
intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally 
request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or 
have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. 
C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to 
intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic 
cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on 
the ground that might support a military intervention. 
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D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their 
veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the 
passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes 
for which there is otherwise majority support. 
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, 
alternative options are: 
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session 
under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and 
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authori- zation from the 
Security Council. 
F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to 
discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for 
action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency 
of that situation – and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer 
thereby. 
(4) Operational Principles 
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to 
match. 
B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and 
unequivocal communications and chain of command. 
C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, 
the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state. 
D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the 
principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian 
law. 
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective. 
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F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations. 
Source: ICISS 2001. International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. pp. xii-xiii. [WWW]. Available: http://
responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. Accessed: 2014-10-05 
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